The Council of the University of the Western Cape recently announced the appointment of Professor Robert Balfour as the incoming Rector and Vice-Chancellor, effective from 1 January 2025. This decision followed a selection process that involved shortlisting candidates, namely Prof Robert Balfour, Prof José Frantz, and Prof Vivienne Lawack. Notably, this list reflected a demographic diversity, with two female candidates and one male, as well as a representation of both white and Coloured individuals as per democratic South Africa’s state-led race identity marking. Given the historical context of UWC’s establishment during the apartheid era, primarily catering to Coloured individuals, questions arise regarding the significance of its past in shaping present-day leadership dynamics. This musing reflects on the dialectical tension between UWC’s apartheid-era legacy and its contemporary institutional identity, particularly manifesting in fulcrum of the recent VC appointment. By engaging the discourse surrounding Professor Balfour’s appointment, this analysis aims to unpack the various perspectives, assumptions, and implications underlying this decision and how its dissent.
The University of the Western Cape (UWC), for many of us our Alma Mater at least for our first academic qualifications, was historically established during the apartheid era in the 1960s. It was primarily designated as a higher learning institution for the congregated cohort of Black individuals, specifically Coloureds. The apartheid-era designation of UWC as a tertiary institution for Coloured individuals inherently reflects the systemic racism and segregation prevalent during that period. Consequently, the historical roots of the institution evoke questions regarding the perpetuation of racial dynamics within its leadership framework. In the contemporary context, the pertinent question arises: what significance should be attributed to the institution’s historical establishment rooted in such racial segregation, and should such notions still hold sway in a democracy, albeit subtly assumed?
The recent announcement by the University of the Western Cape regarding the appointment of Professor Balfour as its next rector has sparked significant social media commentary, revealing a spectrum of concerns and critiques. To comprehend the motivations and expressions underlying the discourse measurable in dissent surrounding this appointment, it becomes imperative to delineate the various perspectives at play.
Firstly, there exists a faction dissatisfied with Balfour’s appointment due to his racial classification as white in the context of democratic South Africa. This demographic lens underscores the ongoing sensitivity surrounding issues of racial representation and equity within institutional leadership.
Secondly, another contingent perceives the appointment as emblematic of a missed opportunity for gender diversity. Specifically, there is lamentation over the failure to appoint a woman, which would have constituted a historic milestone for the institution. Notably, this argument extends beyond mere gender representation to encompass intersectionality, with emphasis placed on the overlooking of women from a certain racial backgrounds.
Furthermore, within this discourse, advocates for a specific female candidate Professor Lawack, emerge, underscoring the belief that a more tailored selection process could have yielded a different outcome conducive to both gender and racial diversity. Moreover, this persuasion is equally susceptible to assumptions. It seems that Balfour’s candidacy was merely a formality, a box-ticking exercise to fulfill numerical requirements, as it was widely expected that Lawack would be selected. The fundamental question is: What prompted this assumption, and what is its basis?
Conversely, some observers interpret the appointment as an affront, although the precise nature of the perceived offense remains ambiguous since the announced shortlisted candidates were not objected to. This sentiment highlights broader concerns regarding the alignment of institutional decisions with prevailing values and historical legacies.
Another group congregates thinking to discuss the matter of the statues at the UWC institution following the rejection of the recommendations put forth by both the SACC and the Senate. The UWC Council engaged in extensive deliberations before reaching this decision.
Indeed, the appointment of the UWC rector catalyzes critical questions concerning the institution’s evolving identity and trajectory. Is the selection process reflective of organic evolution, an accident of history or a contrived narrative? Does the appointment signal a departure from established norms and traditions, and if so, what implications does this hold within the broader societal context?
Moreover, the decision to appoint another male incumbent prompts reflection on the state of women’s empowerment within the institution. Is the perpetuation of male leadership indicative of systemic barriers to gender inclusivity, thereby reinforcing patriarchal structures?
Additionally, considerations of entitlement and meritocracy come to the fore, raising questions about who truly merits leadership roles within the institution and how such determinations are made. Is the perpetuation of certain racial and gender demographics emblematic of institutional inertia or a deliberate safeguarding of historical precedence?
Central to this discourse is the symbolism attributed to racial classifications within the South African context, particularly the implications of identifying as Coloured within a democratic framework. This modulated exploration underscores the multifaceted nature of identity politics within the realm of institutional leadership and governance.
In sum, the appointment of Professor Balfour as the next rector of the University of the Western Cape serves as a catalyst for broader conversations surrounding representation, equity, and institutional identity. By interrogating the various perspectives and implications inherent within this decision, we can better understand the complex interplay of historical legacies, societal norms, and aspirational ideals shaping the future trajectory of the institution.
Perhaps the concept of “subculture” within the context of institutional leadership underscores the implicit norms, values, and power structures that influence decision-making processes and organizational dynamics. Is it possible in the case of UWC no different to other apartheid institutions, the historical association with racial segregation may have engendered a subculture that inadvertently normalizes certain racial hierarchies or biases within its leadership ranks.
Examining the resonance of this historical reality within the institution’s leadership context necessitates a critical appraisal of prevailing assumptions, attitudes, policies, and practices. Is there evidence of systemic barriers or biases that perpetuate the underrepresentation of certain racial groups within leadership positions or is this reserved only for the Vice chancellor role? Do institutional norms inadvertently prioritize the advancement of individuals from specific racial backgrounds, thereby perpetuating historical inequities?
Moreover, understanding the extent to which the historical establishment of UWC continues to shape its leadership dynamics requires an exploration of broader societal attitudes and structural inequalities. The institutional ethos and governance structures must be scrutinized to assess their alignment with principles of diversity, equity, and inclusion. Cognisant of these complexities, it becomes imperative to interrogate the institutional narrative surrounding Balfour’s appointment, UWC’s historical legacy and its implications for contemporary leadership appointment with primary focus of the vice-chancellor position. By acknowledging and critically engaging with the institution’s past practices of appointment in both process and outcome senses, stakeholders can aid the discourse around UWC’s leadership.
It is worth considering the perspectives of advocates for woman leadership in light of the evolving understanding of gender identities that extend beyond the traditional man-woman binary. In academic institutions such as UWC, which are mandated to serve as constitutional safe spaces and uphold democratic values, there’s a growing recognition of diverse gender identities. These identities challenge conventional norms and expectations, prompting institutions to embrace a more inclusive and equitable environment. What are the implications of this shift?
Despite the acknowledged demographic shift at UWC over the past 40 years, which has seen a more diverse student [Biko Black Cohort] and staff population, including a notable presence of democratic South African state-led social identity markers of Indians, Whites, and Africans among the staff, one cannot help but question whether the role of Vice-Chancellor remained untouched in terms of reflecting a Coloured history of leadership control. If indeed the VC position symbolized Coloured leadership control, does Balfour’s appointment signify the end of this symbolism?
In conclusion, the appointment of Professor Balfour as the next rector of UWC provokes critical reflections on representation, equity, and institutional identity. By examining the diverse perspectives surrounding this decision, we gain insight into the complex interplay of historical legacies, societal norms, and aspirational ideals shaping the institution’s future trajectory. Furthermore, this discourse prompts us to scrutinize the implicit norms and power structures within UWC’s leadership context, considering how historical associations with racial segregation may continue to influence decision-making processes. Ultimately, by engaging with these complexities and interrogating the institutional narrative surrounding Balfour’s appointment, stakeholders can contribute to a more informed discourse on UWC’s leadership and its commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion.
In the recent developments surrounding SAFA and Ria Ledwaba, the latter conducted a live press conference on 22nd March. In my analysis, this action was not only within her rights but also arguably necessary, given SAFA’s recurring tendencies that can be characterized as immature. These tendencies are not novel, nor are they confined to the present moment, as previously deliberated.
However, it is imperative to emphasize that my stance does not equate to a defense of SAFA CEO Jordaan, either personally or within the context of his racial classification by the post-Apartheid ANC-led state, which identifies him with a Coloured identity marker. I maintain distinct opinions regarding SAFA and its leadership challenges, which in no way absolve Jordaan or any predecessors who have helmed SAFA throughout its history.
Regarding South Africa’s contemporary adherence to racial classifications for its populace, derived from the framework of apartheid racial ideology, albeit with a contended focus on redress, my perspectives are clear. Race, far from being a benign construct, is inherently intertwined with the perpetuation of racism. Therefore, the persistence of racial classifications within democratic South Africa engenders both historical continuities and novel complexities.
Ultimately, the upholding of such racial classifications presents South Africa with its own set of historical legacies and contemporary dilemmas, emphasizing the imperative for critical examination and reconsideration within the framework of democratic governance.
The primary focus of this opinion piece is to critically examine the meaning and possible implications of Leslie Sedibe’s controversial statement, “I am not going to call him doctor. Danny boy…” in reference to SAFA CEO Danny Jordaan. Through analyzing Sedibe’s choice of words and the broader context of racial dynamics in post-apartheid South Africa, this piece seeks to shed light on the complexities of identity, power dynamics, and linguistic nuances in contemporary society. I therefore wish to engage some of the choice words of Mr. Leslie Sedibe, who served as SAFA CEO during the period of January 2010 to February 2011.
It is a matter of record that Sedibe, an attorney by profession, has been entangled in a number of legal disputes with SAFA, some culminating in a Constitutional Court ruling which was not in his favour. Consequently, Sedibe potentially and rightfully stands among the aggrieved parties, viewing Jordaan’s leadership within SAFA as the purported villain.
During the presser, Sedibe had to be reminded of the presence of a programme director and that he was now taking her role. To this, he perhaps irritably responded, “I am just helping [facilitating].” Sedibe cited in verbatim: “Mr Jordaan, I am not going to call him doctor. Danny boy, we demand an apology. You must unreservedly apologise to Ms Ria Ledwaba, and you must explain to the people of South Africa why you took such an irresponsible decision together with the members of the NEC.”
Mr. Sedibe’s choice of words proves rather interesting given the fact that Sedibe is a legal practitioner and should know the power of words and language, “Mr. Jordaan, I will not call him Doctor…” and followed with “Danny boy…” My concern here isn’t Sedibe’s right to an opinion on whether Jordaan is entitled to be referred to as Doctor. The issue lies in whether Sedibe’s views are principled or driven by other motivations. If rooted in principle, we may deduce that Sedibe is among those who do not regard honorary degrees, regardless of the institution granting them. Absolutely nothing wrong since there is a vibrant segment of societal life that rejects the awarding of honorary degrees regardless to who the beneficiaries are.
In this setting it is noteworthy that at least three other key figures in the SAFA football fraternity have received similar honours. Irvin Khoza, a recipient from the University of Zululand in 2004, Kaizer Motaung, who received recognition from the University of Cape Town in 2022, and Patrice Motsepe, honoured by the University of the Witwatersrand in 2017, hold such titles. Meanwhile, Danny Jordaan, associated with Dower College, where he served as a senior lecturer and later as rector of part-time programs, received his honoris causa award from NMMU.
The issue of honorary doctorates in SAFA/PSL circles is thus not uncommon. The million-dollar question Sedibe must answer is whether he upholds the same standards for Khoza, Motaung and Motsepe among others—will he also refuse to refer to them as doctors? Additionally, we must inquire if Sedibe has ever referred to Jordaan with such a title in his dealings with SAFA as an employee or official. If so, claiming principle as the reason for his current refusal would be questionable.
Furthermore, what did Sedibe mean by referring to Jordaan as “Danny boy,” especially after stating his refusal to refer to Jordaan as “Doctor”? Was this of affectionate intent? Was it intended to show disdain, insult and infantilize Jordaan? The case can be made that Sedibe, coming from a cultural background that values respect for elders, should have been aware of the potential disrespect in addressing Jordaan in such a manner. Alternatively, should Sedibe’s conscious choice to refer to Jordaan as “Danny boy” be understood through the lens of entitled truant youthful antics? Why did Sedibe felt entitled to stoop to this level of insult? Could his anger towards SAFA and Danny Jordaan justifiably be blamed for his actions at this Ria Ledwaba presser? Is Sedibe representing a constituency in whichever form that feels entitled to behave in this fashion?
I do not have to remind any of us that during the apartheid era in South Africa, the use of language was often employed as a potent tool of oppression and dehumanization, reflecting the deeply entrenched racial hierarchies and discriminatory attitudes of the time. One notable aspect of this was how those apartheid extended an uncritical white identity marker would often refer to older Black men as “boys” and Black women as “girls.”
This practice was rooted in the racist ideology of white supremacy, which sought to diminish the dignity and agency of Black people by denying them the respect and recognition afforded to their white counterparts. By using terms like “boys” and “girls” to refer to Black adults, white individuals sought to assert their perceived superiority and reinforce the social hierarchy that placed Black people at the bottom.
The use of such language served to infantilize and demean Black individuals, reducing them to the status of children and denying them the full rights and autonomy afforded to adults. It was a way of reinforcing the power dynamics of apartheid, where white dominance and Black subjugation were normalized and enforced through various means, including language. The only difference is now in post-Apartheid South Africa the superior identity advanced is the questionable African reserved for those entitled today to perhaps act in the manner as Sedibe has in this instance.
Therefore, when we observe similar language choices, such as Sedibe’s use of “Danny boy” to refer to SAFA CEO Danny Jordaan, it raises concerns about the persistence of racial biases and power imbalances in post-apartheid South Africa. It serves as a reminder of the enduring legacy of apartheid and the ongoing struggle to overcome its pervasive effects on society and culture.
The inquiry into Sedibe’s adherence to state-sponsored racial categorization and its conceivable impact on his treatment of Danny Jordaan holds significant relevance within the milieu of post-apartheid South Africa. In a society contending with the enduring ramifications of apartheid, the persisting racial classifications sanctioned by the post-apartheid state ideology, along with resultant anomalies, persist in shaping societal dynamics and interactions, albeit in nuanced manners.
The question of Sedibe’s state-led racial classification and its potential influence on his treatment of Danny Jordaan is indeed pertinent in the context of post-apartheid South Africa. In a society grappling with the legacies of apartheid, racial classifications and new anomalies sustained by the post- apartheid state ideology and policies continue to shape social dynamics and interactions, albeit in more subtle ways.
If Sedibe identifies as African as is directed by ANC-State-led post-apartheid South Africa social identity marking, it is essential to consider how historical racial categorizations, particularly the apartheid-era classification system, might influence his perceptions and attitudes towards individuals of different racial backgrounds.
Given this historical context, Sedibe’s treatment of Jordaan, whom the same ANC led State maintain racial classification of Coloured, could potentially be influenced by deeply ingrained racial biases and perceptions associated with apartheid-era classifications. He may view Jordaan through the lens of his racial classification, consciously or unconsciously, and this could manifest in his conscious choice of language and behaviour towards him at least as seen from the Ledwaba presser.
Furthermore, the dynamics of power and privilege within post-apartheid South Africa cannot be ignored. While apartheid-era racial classifications purport to have officially been dismantled, the legacy of racial inequality persists, and individuals from different racial backgrounds may still navigate social spaces differently based on historical experiences and socio-economic factors.
Therefore, examining Sedibe’s state-led racial classification and its potential impact on his treatment of Jordaan underscores the complexities of race relations in post-apartheid South Africa and the ongoing challenges of addressing historical injustices and promoting social cohesion in a diverse society.
Was Sedibe exercising his prerogative to disparage, infantilize, and insult Jordaan based on his potential acceptance of his entitled superior race as extended within a post-apartheid framework of ‘African’ versus ‘Coloured’ ?
We ought to refrain from resorting to the assumption that anything is permissible when we hold divergent viewpoints or rightfully experience grievance. There would have been nothing wrong for Sedibe to consistently refer to Jordaan as Danny Jordaan throughout.
In conclusion, the discourse surrounding Leslie Sedibe’s remarks towards Danny Jordaan unveils layers of historical, and new anomalies of racial, and socio-political complexities in post-apartheid South Africa. Sedibe’s language choices and behaviour reflect not only personal opinions but also ingrained societal biases and power dynamics inherited from the apartheid era. It calls for a deeper examination of language, identity, and privilege in shaping interpersonal relationships and social interactions within the ongoing struggle for reconciliation and social justice in South Africa.
The article ferrets into the multifaceted discourse surrounding the portrayal of the Biblical Jesus Christ, particularly focusing on the dichotomy between depictions of ‘Black’ and ‘White’ Jesus notions. It engages the ‘significance’ of the recent Russian exhibition, which for some unveils irrefutable evidence and findings regarding the potential historical authenticity of a Black Jesus figure. Spearheaded by the Russian government and inaugurated by President Vladimir Putin, the exhibition for some promises to challenge conventional perceptions of Jesus’ ethnicity and interrogate the implications of such revelations for contemporary understandings of faith, identity, and cultural heritage. However, on March 29, Reuters reports that a video of Russian President Vladimir Putin presenting an Orthodox icon to military commanders in April 2023 is being misrepresented by posts online that say it shows him saying that Jesus was Black, adding a layer of intrigue and controversy to the ongoing discussion surrounding the portrayal of Jesus.
The unveiling of the Russian findings regarding the portrayal of a ‘Black Jesus’, now showcased in a traveling exhibition, marks another moment in the discourse surrounding religious iconography and historical representation. Less for it being necessarily true but for the assumed meaning of such.
Through meticulous research and archaeological discoveries stored within the vaults, this exhibition for some promises to challenge conventional perceptions of Jesus’ ethnicity and interrogate the implications of such revelations for contemporary understandings of faith, identity, and cultural heritage. As the doors to these vaults swing open, they beckon ideologues, scholars, theologians, and curious minds alike from its debris to embark on a journey that may fundamentally reshape our understanding of one of history’s most iconic figures.
At the outset, it is imperative to delineate the specific scope of this article, excluding certain tangential considerations. Firstly, this article refrains from exploring into the overtly political dimensions entailed by the temporal confluence of Easter, a significant annual event in the Christian calendar, and the tenure of Vladimir Putin, who has led Russia beyond the past 25 months amidst heightened tensions with NATO and ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine. Secondly, the discourse herein does not address the perspectives of Muslim scholars, who, motivated by whatever interest, may seek to leverage the Russian ‘Black Jesus’ exhibition to bolster the authenticity of the Quran vis-à-vis the Christian Sacred Text, commonly referred to as the Bible. While these are undoubtedly pertinent discussions worthy of exploration, they are deemed tangential to the focus of this inaugural article on the subject matter, given their divergence from its central thematic thrust.
In my assessment, the discourse surrounding the portrayal of a Black Jesus operates on multiple levels, whether grounded in historical reality or emerging from recent revelations such as those purportedly revealed by the Russian exhibition. This multifaceted discourse necessitates careful consideration and engagement due to its complex nature and potential implications.
Firstly, it pertains to the inquiry into the authentic historical identity of Jesus. This inquiry delves into the complexities of reconstructing the true persona of the historical figure.
Secondly, it involves a concurrent examination of the prevalence and significance of the prevailing depiction of Jesus as white, along with its historical underpinnings.
Thirdly, building upon the preceding considerations, this perspective situates the discourse within the framework of social constructionism regarding race. It posits that race serves as a comprehensive framework for elucidating, comprehending, and categorizing individuals who, by virtue of their shared human essence, are encompassed within the singular construct of the human race.
In the fourth instance it addresses the implications of acknowledging a Black identity for Jesus’ historical persona, challenging established orthodoxies and institutionalized narratives.
In the fifth instance, it delineates the prominent role of ideology over the course of time, centralized within the discourse surrounding juxtaposed notions of a Black and white Jesus.
Lastly, it extends to the significance of such a portrayal for individuals grappling with their own identities, particularly within the African American context.
The recent unveiling of the Russian exhibition, now a safeguarded traveling showcase since 2023, encapsulates these multifaceted dimensions.
In a sense it re-echos the pivotal question posed by Jesus in the biblical narrative—“Who do men say I am?”—the exhibition serves as a locus for exploring this question from diverse perspectives and contexts.
The interest shown by some Pan-Africans, particularly among a subset of African American communities, in interpreting the Russian vault unveiling as irrefutable evidence of a historical black Jesus stems from a deep-seated desire for cultural empowerment, historical reclamation, and identity validation. For centuries, African-descended peoples have been subjected to the dehumanizing effects of colonialism, slavery, and systemic racism, which have sought to erase their histories, marginalize their contributions, and undermine their sense of self-worth. In this context, the prospect of discovering evidence supporting the existence of a Black Jesus serves as a powerful symbol of resistance against Eurocentric narratives and a means of reclaiming agency over one’s cultural and religious heritage. Moreover, for African Americans, who have long grappled with questions of belonging and identity in a society marked by racial prejudice and inequality, the notion of a Black Jesus offers a sense of validation and affirmation of their intrinsic worth and dignity as members of the human family.
Furthermore, the appetite for interpreting the Russian unveiling as evidence of a Black historical Jesus is fuelled by a broader quest for historical accuracy and inclusivity within religious discourse. Africans and African American communities have long been critical of the whitewashing of religious iconography and the perpetuation of Eurocentric interpretations that marginalize non-white experiences and perspectives. The unveiling of potential evidence supporting a Black Jesus provides an opportunity to challenge entrenched narratives of racial superiority and cultural hegemony, while also fostering a more inclusive and diverse understanding of spirituality and faith. By reclaiming Jesus as a figure who reflects the diversity and universality of human experience, proponents of a Black historical Jesus seek to dismantle systems of oppression and affirm the inherent value of all people, regardless of race or ethnicity.
For those seeking an authentic understanding of Jesus’ historical identity, the contents of the Russian vaults assume significance akin to a puritanical quest. However, the very nature of this question unveils inherent dichotomies, anomalies, and deviations. Consequently, it engenders potential crises of faith, historical interpretation, and personal identity, interwoven into a complex quilt.
The prevalence of a white Jesus in religious iconography serves as a problematic extension of colonial agendas that have historically perpetuated systems of oppression and exploitation, particularly impacting African communities. This portrayal not only reflects the Eurocentric biases embedded within colonial ideologies but also reinforces narratives of cultural superiority and racial hierarchy. By depicting Jesus as white, colonial powers sought to legitimize their domination over indigenous peoples and justify the subjugation of non-white populations. Furthermore, the association of whiteness with divinity and salvation has been used as a tool of control, compelling marginalized groups to internalize their own inferiority and submit to the authority of their oppressors. Consequently, the image of a white Jesus has become intertwined with the legacy of colonialism, symbolizing the enduring power dynamics that continue to marginalize and disenfranchise communities of color around the world.
Furthermore, the notion that Jesus may have been black raises profound questions about the implications of such a revelation. If indeed Jesus’ true historical identity aligns with a black ethnicity, as opposed to the whitewashed portrayal perpetuated by colonial agendas that boldly depicts a white Jesus, how does this revelation reshape our understanding of history and its impact on contemporary consciousness? Does it elucidate historical events, confer newfound significance upon Blackness, or catalyze a transformative moment (“Kairos”) within the continuum of time (“Chronos”)?
Proponents advocating for the recognition of a black Jesus as the authentic representation have yet to articulate why his ethnicity is consequential and for whom. They are called upon to elucidate the distinction between their conception of his black identity and the whitewashed portrayal propagated by colonial agendas.
Thus the distinction between recognizing a Black Jesus as the authentic representation and the whitewashed portrayal perpetuated by colonial agendas is crucial for several reasons. Firstly, it challenges the dominant narrative that has historically marginalized and erased the identities of Black individuals, perpetuating systems of oppression and inequality. By acknowledging Jesus’ potential Black identity, it validates and affirms the experiences and contributions of Black people throughout history. Secondly, it disrupts the pervasive Eurocentric worldview that has shaped cultural, religious, and social norms, fostering a more inclusive and diverse understanding of spirituality and faith. Thirdly, it underscores the importance of historical accuracy and integrity, urging us to confront and rectify the distortions and erasures in our collective memory. Ultimately, the recognition of a Black Jesus holds profound implications for fostering empathy, understanding, and solidarity across racial and cultural divides, promoting a more just and equitable society.
The emergence of the notion of a Black Jesus, while ostensibly offering a counter-narrative to the prevailing white agenda, paradoxically mirrors the same dynamics of racialized identities perpetuated by colonial ideologies. While the intent may be to challenge Eurocentric representations and reclaim agency for marginalized communities, the emphasis on racial identity risks reinforcing essentialist notions of race and perpetuating divisive dichotomies. Just as the white agenda utilized the image of a white Jesus to assert dominance and justify oppression, the promotion of a Black Jesus can inadvertently contribute to the marginalization of other racial and ethnic groups. While the distinction lies in the target of oppression, the underlying mechanism of perpetuating racialized identities remains consistent. Therefore, while the emergence of a Black Jesus may serve as a form of resistance against historical injustices, it is crucial to interrogate the implications of essentializing race and strive towards a more inclusive and subtle understanding of identity that transcends rigid racial boundaries.
While the recognition of a Black Jesus as an authentic representation challenges the prevailing whitewashed portrayal, it inadvertently reinforces the construct of race as a defining aspect of human existence. By focusing on the dichotomy between white and Black identities, this distinction perpetuates the notion that individuals’ worth and experiences are intrinsically tied to their racial categorization. In doing so, it inadvertently essentializes race, overlooking the fluidity and complexity of human identity beyond rigid racial boundaries. Furthermore, by centring the debate around the racial identity of Jesus, there is a risk of overlooking other important aspects of his teachings and message, which transcend racial distinctions and speak to universal themes of love, compassion, and justice. This narrow focus on race runs the risk of reducing Jesus to a symbol of racial identity politics rather than engaging with the deeper spiritual and ethical dimensions of his teachings.
Moreover, while challenging Eurocentric narratives is important, the emphasis on Jesus’ Black identity can inadvertently reinforce racial binaries and hierarchies, potentially marginalizing other non-white or non-Black perspectives. In seeking to rectify historical erasures, there is a danger of oversimplifying complex historical realities and overlooking the diversity of experiences within marginalized communities. Rather than essentializing race, a more fruitful approach might involve deconstructing the power dynamics and systems of oppression that have perpetuated racial inequalities and exploring alternative narratives that transcend racial categorizations altogether. Ultimately, while the recognition of a Black Jesus may serve as a catalyst for social and cultural transformation, it is essential to approach these discussions with a critical lens that interrogates the underlying assumptions and implications of perpetuating racial essentialism in the pursuit of justice and equity.
Interpreting the notion of race, a formalized construct emerging in 1785 with Immanuel Kant, within the context of ancient biblical texts or even the dated depictions of a Black Jesus dating back to the 1400s, presents a precarious endeavor. Such anachronistic readings risk superimposing modern conceptualizations of race onto historical contexts vastly disparate in their understanding of identity and ethnicity. Attempting to retrofit these constructs onto ancient texts or artworks can lead to oversimplifications and distortions of the original meanings, disregarding the complexities of historical and cultural contexts in which these narratives and representations emerged. Moreover, it overlooks the fluidity and diversity of human identities throughout history, reducing them to static categories defined solely by physical characteristics.
Both proponents and opponents of a Black or white Jesus must tread carefully in their interpretations and defenses. Upholding a rigid adherence to either portrayal without acknowledging the complexities and nuances surrounding historical depictions risks perpetuating essentialist and exclusionary narratives. It is essential for scholars and advocates to engage critically with the historical and cultural contexts of these representations, recognizing the limitations and biases inherent in them. By doing so, they can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of identity and representation, fostering dialogue and inclusivity rather than perpetuating divisive and reductive interpretations.
The quest for either a Black or white Jesus within historical settings parallels the cyclic nature of ideological iterations, wherein proponents of each portrayal often find themselves ensnared in spirals of entrenched rhetoric. This phenomenon underscores the central role of ideology in shaping debates surrounding the historical Jesus and his perceived identity. Ideological biases, rooted in historical contexts and perpetuated by cultural narratives, often manifest as fervent fortifications of one portrayal over the other. However, such entrenched positions not only obscure nuanced understandings of historical realities but also perpetuate divisive dichotomies that oversimplify the complexities of identity. Whether advocating for a Black Jesus as a symbol of empowerment for marginalized communities or defending a white Jesus as a representation of established cultural norms, these ideological stances reflect broader societal tensions and power dynamics. In essence, the debate over the racial identity of Jesus becomes a microcosm of larger ideological struggles, illustrating how deeply entrenched beliefs can shape interpretations of historical figures and their significance in contemporary discourse.
Irrespective of the agendas surrounding discourse over the portrayal of a black and or white Jesus, the significance of the Russian exhibition extends beyond mere racial considerations. From a recorded history perspective, this showcase offers invaluable insights into the evolution of religious iconography and the complexities of cultural interpretations spanning centuries. By scrutinizing ancient texts and artistic depictions, the exhibition invites us to delve into the rich tapestry of human creativity and interpretation, navigating diverse streams of ideological persuasions and scholarly interpretations. Moreover, it serves as a catalyst for critical reflection on the fluidity of identity, the power dynamics inherent in historical narratives, and the ways in which they shape our understanding of the past and present. Ultimately, the exhibition prompts us to engage in nuanced and inclusive dialogues that transcend simplistic dichotomies, fostering a deeper appreciation for the multifaceted nature of human history and the myriad ways in which it continues to inform our collective consciousness.
In conclusion, I wish to contend that beyond the surface-level debate of racial representations, the Russian exhibition holds profound significance in unraveling the complexities of religious iconography and historical interpretation less in authenticity but the symbolism and added material for the existing and long standing quests. By transcending simplistic dichotomies and engaging with diverse ideological perspectives, the exhibition prompts critical reflection on the fluidity of identity, the impact of colonial legacies, and the power dynamics inherent in historical narratives. Ultimately, it underscores the importance of fostering delicate and inclusive dialogues that acknowledge the complexities of human history and strive towards a more equitable and empathetic understanding of the past and present.
Getty Image: Speaker of Parliament Mrs. Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula and President Cyril M. Ramaphosa
On Tuesday, March 19th, the East Rand Bedfordview residence of the Speaker of Parliament and ANC leader, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, was subjected to a search-and-seizure operation amidst swirling speculations of an impending arrest expected for Friday, March 22nd, which ultimately did not materialize. This turn of events unfolded as Mapisa-Nqakula swiftly brought forth an urgent interdict against key figures, including the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Advocate Shamila Batohi, the Minister of Police, Bheki Cele, along with the entities these individuals represent.
It is crucial to understand the foundation upon which Mapisa-Nqakula’s rationale for the urgent interdict is constructed. She asserts that neither she nor her legal representatives were notified of any impending search-and-seizure operation or the purported warrant for her arrest. Moreover, she emphasizes the potential irreparable harm that her arrest and subsequent prosecution could inflict upon her distinguished career and life’s mission.
Mapisa-Nqakula’s urgent interdict aims to forestall her imminent arrest and prosecution, as demonstrated by her recent submission of a comprehensive 94-page document in support of her application. This legal artifice signals her cognizance of the ongoing investigation, a matter she was well aware of during her tenure as Minister of Defence. However, the timing of her interdict following the raid on her premises on March 19, 2024, suggests a potential oversight or miscalculation regarding the likelihood of such legal actions being taken against her. Central to her plea is the demand for access to all relevant information, ostensibly to mitigate irreparable harm to her reputation. Significantly, this encompasses not only exculpatory evidence but also documents pivotal in orchestrating the aforementioned search and seizure operation.
A critical analysis of Mapisa-Nqakula’s interdict raises broader considerations regarding its ramifications on prosecutorial prerogatives and the equitable dispensation of legal mechanisms. The invocation of similar endeavours, notably by the former now late Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi, prompts scrutiny into the inherent tensions between individual rights and law enforcement imperatives. Furthermore, the perception of disparate treatment based on socio-political status raises pertinent questions about the fairness and integrity of legal proceedings. Consequently, while Mapisa-Nqakula’s legal strategy may offer a transient respite, it underscores deeper systemic issues concerning access to justice and the impartial administration of the law.
Mapisa-Nqakula’s pursuit of an urgent interdict not only underscores her immediate legal objectives but also suggests a strategic ruse aimed at prolonging the legal process. This approach finds precedence in the handling of the intended arrest of Ace Magashule, where pre-emptive media engagement compelled the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to reassess its initial plans.
I vividly recall receiving a call on that Tuesday, from an ANC and Ace Magashule sympathizer asking me for my thoughts and strategy, to which I responded, if Ace knows he will be arrested by Friday in the typical Hollywood drama that the NPA at the time came to be known for, he should get the media to publicize it to call the bluff of the NPA. The same was done, and the NPA swallowed its own words, denying there was ever any warrant of arrest for Ace Magashule. Despite initially refuting the existence of a warrant for Magashule’s arrest, subsequent events revealed a reversal in the NPA’s position, culminating in his apprehension six weeks later without the anticipated media spectacle. This parallel highlights the potentially dilatory nature of Mapisa-Nqakula’s legal actions, prompting questions about the efficacy of such tactics in navigating the intricacies of legal proceedings and shaping public perceptions.
Mapisa-Nqakula’s assertion that the search- and-seizure operation, along with the purported warrant of arrest, is politically motivated, while convenient, gains significance when considering the intricate dynamics within the African National Congress (ANC). The allegations leveled against her, as brought by a defense contractor, contend that she benefited from large sums of money which she demanded. Additionally, for some, her husband, Charles Nqakula, who formerly served as an advisor to President Cyril Ramaphosa until he was subsequently replaced by Sidney Mufamadi, may also play into this. This transition, coupled with other ripples around Mapisa-Nqakula, coincided with a broader crisis of corruption engulfing the ANC, which has irked many South Africans and eroded public trust in the party. Notably, corruption has become a pervasive issue within the ANC, and it is often wielded purposefully and, at times, factionally under Ramaphosa’s leadership. This complex interplay of political power, personal associations, and the endemic corruption plaguing the ANC underscores the contentious backdrop against which Mapisa-Nqakula’s claims of political targeting must be considered.
In the current discourse, the commentary by the ANC Speaker of Parliament, Mapisa Nqakula, regarding her perceived victimization by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) through the search and seizure conducted at her residence, coupled with the prospect of her impending arrest, can be construed as emblematic of a calculated political narrative. Such an assertion ostensibly implicates President Ramaphosa as the orchestrator or benefactor of these actions.
The pending arrest, which I hold will occur soon, of Speaker Mapisa-Nqakula, a figure embroiled in various controversies, notably the use of a military flight for personal purposes, extends beyond mere legal implications. In 2016 it was reported that the then Defence Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula smuggled a Burundian woman with a false passport into South Africa on an air force jet. This was admitted by Mapisa- Nqakula in her then Sunday Times interview, she maintaining a defiant stance on actions denied she had abused her power, saying: “I’d do it again if I had to.” As per the published media reports, Mapisa-Nqakula admitted to flying from Waterkloof Air Force Base to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2014 to retrieve Michelle Wege, who had been detained at Kinshasa International Airport for attempting to board a flight with fraudulent documents allegedly organized by Mapisa-Nqakula’s sister. Wege’s fake passport identified her as a Congolese national named Amina Yambayamba, arousing suspicion due to her inability to speak French or regional languages. Mapisa-Nqakula, accompanied by a delegation including a high-ranking air force official, negotiated Wege’s release and subsequently travelled with her to a conference in Addis Ababa before returning to South Africa. Mapisa-Nqakula’s sister, then South Africa’s deputy ambassador to Burundi, was later suspended for her involvement in obtaining the fraudulent documents.
It would appear that Mapisa-Nqakula’s rapport with Ramaphosa deteriorated when the president imposed a three-month salary deduction upon her, subsequent to revelations that she had provided transportation for an ANC delegation via a South African National Defence Force (SANDF) jet to convene with their Zanu-PF counterparts in Zimbabwe in September.
On May 9, 2021, news reports indicated that former Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, had resigned from his position as President Cyril Ramaphosa’s national security adviser. Speculation arose regarding a potential cabinet reshuffle involving Ramaphosa’s wife, Nosiviwe. Nqakula, who had been appointed by Ramaphosa in June 2018, previously served as the general secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), succeeding the late party leader Chris Hani. Acting presidential spokesperson Tyrone Seale confirmed Nqakula’s resignation, citing “personal reasons” as the cause. Seale further stated that although Nqakula had stepped down from full-time employment, he expressed a willingness to continue providing advisory support to the president. Seale clarified that no vacancy had arisen as the appointment of advisers remained within the prerogative of the president. Thus, the resignation of Charles Nqakula, while mentioned by many, may not be a significant matter, but rather attention should be focused on the actions and inactions of Mapisa-Nqakula as an individual.
In the aftermath of the July 2021 unrest, which concentrated in geographic nodes of Kwa Zulu Natal and Gauteng, the lack of leadership between three departments namely intelligence, police, and defense was laid bare. Then Defense Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, in her July 19, 2021 statement on the unrest, contradicted that of the President, who explained it as an act of insurrection. However, on the 21st, she revisited her statement and aligned herself with that of the president. Mapisa-Nqakula reversed her earlier stance on the nature of South Africa’s recent unrest, now aligning with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s characterization of it as an insurrection rather than a mere counter-revolution. This change follows criticism of her initial comments to Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defense, where she described the events as signs of counter-revolution rather than insurrection.
Acting Minister in the Presidency, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, challenged Mapisa-Nqakula’s assertion, emphasizing that the facts did not support her viewpoint. Mapisa-Nqakula subsequently conceded during a briefing at the SA Police Service training academy in Durban that it was indeed an attempted insurrection, clarifying that her earlier use of the term counter-revolution was not intended to contradict the President but rather to highlight the undermining of state authority. She emphasized her role as a member of the National Security Council and stated that there was no deliberate attempt to contradict the President. Meanwhile, Ntshavheni reported progress in arrests of alleged instigators of the violence and efforts to restore economic activity, with major routes and economic nodes operational, though the death toll from the unrest stands at 215. In Gauteng, the situation has stabilized, and efforts for clean-up and business continuity are underway, with key transportation networks gradually returning to operation.
The NPA’s search-and-seizure and the very real warrant on Mapisa-Nqakula, occurring virtually two months before South Africa’s seventh national elections, where the ANC appears more vulnerable than ever before, sends conflicting signals that have ramifications for the ANC, regardless of how it may want to deny it.
It prompts us to consider broader political dynamics and motivations. Particularly noteworthy is her elevation to the role of Speaker following the July 2021 unrest, despite the calls for dismissal of multiple officials including Nqakula herself, Cele, and Dlodlo. This promotion begs the question: what interests and whose agenda propelled her to this position?
It is evident that Cyril Ramaphosa recognized Mapisa-Nqakula’s compromised status when he chose to promote her strategically positioning her as Speaker, thereby ensuring her allegiance in defending the ruling Ramaphosa ANC’s interests within Parliament. Her influence was conspicuous in pivotal events such as the extraordinary impeachment proceedings instituted against Public Protector Mkhwebane and Judge Hlophe to name as observables. However, her defiance in entertaining the establishment of a Section 89 Panel on Phala Phala, yielding to the removal of academic Richard Calland a known Ramaphosa supporter as panellist and risking the unfavourable findings against Ramaphosa to stand could not have augured well with Ramaphosa. Ultimately she also stewarded Parlaiment’s choices to reject its own initiated Section 89 Panel all in the interest of Ramaphosa second-termism
Nqakula’s subsequent efforts to shield Ramaphosa in what some Opposition parties considered manipulating Parliament to ensure no secret ballot in vote was entertained, and the subsequent rejection of the panel’s report underscore her loyalty to the ruling faction. While her legal culpability in the NPA’s case of corruption against her should not be overlooked, the overarching narrative reveals a politically orchestrated spectacle aimed at making an example of her, particularly regarding her stance in instituting the Section 89 panel, succumbing to the pressure to have Richard Calland who was the third panellist removed in September 2022. This episode portrays her as obstinate in the face of political pressure.
In conclusion, while acknowledging the necessity of holding individuals accountable for their actions, it is imperative to contextualize the search-and-seizure execution and unavoidable arrest within the broader landscape of ANC political engineering and power struggles. When Mapisa-Nqakula currently expresses dissent regarding a political campaign in which she discerns President Ramaphosa’s vested interests, she should reflect upon a past occurrence during the 2017 election campaign. At that time, she addressed the birthday celebration of then-contender Jeff Radebe, wherein she lamented the candidacy of a political newcomer (Ramaphosa) while suggesting that someone of Radebe’s stature would be more apt for the position. It is improbable that Mapisa-Nqakula assumed unanimous agreement among attendees at the birthday gathering. Consequently, given President Ramaphosa’s reputedly retentive memory, characterized by a propensity for discerning justice, he may well have retained recollection of this particular incident. It serves as a stark reminder of the intricacies and complexities inherent in South Africa’s political sphere, where legal proceedings often intersect with larger political narratives. Martin Niemoller’s words are particularly poignant and ring true in the abyss of ANC politics and factional drama: “First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out—because I was not a socialist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out—because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—because I was not a Jew. Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.” —Martin Niemöller.
Some in the ANC might admonish Mapisa-Nqakula, urging her to reflect on those she may have stepped on, disregarded or harmed in her ascent to ANC and SA political office and power, including figures such as the late Mama Winnie Mandela. It is pertinent to consider the individuals whom she may have neglected, ignored, or treated callously when she now seeks to attribute her forthcoming arrest on corruption charges solely to political motivations.
In the intricate quilt of contemporary South African politics, few figures loom as large as Jacob Zuma, former president and stalwart of the African National Congress (ANC). His recent decision to establish the MKP (MK Party) and launch a vigorous campaign against the ANC, led by Cyril Ramaphosa, has sent shockwaves through the political landscape, prompting intense scrutiny and debate. At the heart of this discourse lies a fundamental question: What motivates Zuma to embark on such a bold and seemingly contradictory course of action while steadfastly maintaining his allegiance to the ANC?
This musing endeavours to unsnarl the complex web of motivations driving Zuma’s actions, shedding light on the multifaceted dynamics shaping his campaign. Central to our exploration are two cardinal aspects that define Zuma’s motivation: his deep-seated fear of imprisonment, in which imprisonment will immortalise his legacy and his unwavering commitment to safeguarding his personal legacy within the ANC’s historical narrative.
I commence my analysis by dissecting Zuma’s decision to establish the MKP and the strategic implications for the ANC under Ramaphosa’s leadership. Through a careful examination of Zuma’s tactical maneuvers and strategic calculations, we aim to illuminate the underlying motivations propelling his campaign against the ANC establishment. Subsequently, we pivot towards a comparative analysis between Zuma and his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, offering insights into their similar quest for legacy preservation and yet divergent approaches and their roles within the broader historical narrative of the ANC. This comparative lens provides an understanding of the complex motivations driving Zuma’s actions and their broader implications for South African politics.
Furthermore, we momentarily explore the legal landscape surrounding Zuma’s campaign, highlighting the implications of his legal battles and the broader socio-political context within which they unfold. This segment underscores the interplay between law, politics, and personal identity in shaping Zuma’s ongoing struggle within the ANC. Finally, we draw parallels between Zuma’s campaign and global examples of political resilience, contextualizing his actions within a broader framework of comparative politics. Through this comparative perspective, we aim to deepen our understanding of the complexities of South African politics and the enduring legacies of its political giants.
In essence, this article navigates through the ever-vaccilating terrain of South African politics, offering an analysis of the motivations, strategies, and implications of Zuma’s campaign against the ANC. By unraveling the enigma surrounding Zuma’s actions, I seek to provide some insights into the forces shaping contemporary South African politics and the enduring legacies of its political actors.
Jacob Zuma’s decision to endorse and aid the establishing of the MKP and thus instigating a recent and now virulent campaign against the African National Congress (ANC) led by Cyril Ramaphosa has stirred considerable debate and controversy. Many have asked questions about the purpose, intention, and motivation behind Zuma’s contention that he will remain an ANC member while overseeing the establishment of the MK Party in these elections. At first glance, it appears foolish, as Mbeki expressed in his recent diatribe on Zuma. It is clear that Zuma is a disruptive factor, and the ANC could not handle what it typically would; anyone who attempted what Zuma is doing now would have been summarily expelled. The question arises: why has Zuma not been expelled but rather suspended from membership? This inaction on the part of the ANC does not merely indicate a tactical move; it attests to the true threat Zuma poses for the incumbent. What is different here?
Where he previously contested from within, he in this season is contesting from the outside. This fact speaks to at least three aspects of his strategy: 1. He has given up trying to effect change within the ANC. 2. He does not believe the ANC can rectify itself, at least not in the manner he and his supporters envision. Thirdly, he has decided to involve South Africa, better understood in the context of the 7th national elections, as his playground and space to exert his will on the Ramaphosa-led ANC.
His survival tactics place him at the intersection of two contrasting phenomena: ‘Zuma-Mania’ and ‘Zuma Phobia’ . These dynamics are not only innate to his persona but are also influenced by the current socio-political landscape of KwaZulu-Natal as a province. Consequently, the MKP represents a convergence of a constituency primarily focused on the central figure of Zuma.
In light of Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s recent departure, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) finds itself grappling with uncertainty, while the National Freedom Party (NFP) remains without leadership. Meanwhile, the African National Congress (ANC) in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) appears lackluster, with its current leadership arguably failing to match the stature of figures such as the late Harry Gwala, who Zuma could align himself with. Moreover, amidst ongoing questions surrounding the Kingdom of MisiZulu’s stability, it is noteworthy that it was President Ramaphosa who endorsed the new King. Zuma is acutely cognizant of the intricate challenges and contradictions stemming from the intertwined domains of monarchy, inter and intra party politics, and the economy within this province.
Drawing upon his extensive history of involvement, spanning over three decades since his deployment to KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), Jacob Zuma possesses a clear understanding of the region’s socio-political dynamics. Recognizing the pressing need for seasoned leadership, Zuma discerns that KZN requires a figure of senior stature, one capable of invoking the spirit of the Gwala era and articulating authoritative discourse without equivocation. His pivotal role in mediating peace between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC during a tumultuous period underscores his significance within the province’s political landscape. Thus, it is to KZN that Zuma returns, propelled by a determination to defend his legacy and unsettle the hegemony of the Ramaphosa-led ANC, with the potential consequence of jeopardizing the party’s hold over its second province in national elections.
There exists a cohort of individuals who contemplate why Jacob Zuma does not merely choose a graceful departure from the political sphere. While some may attribute his age as a valid rationale for advocating his withdrawal, it is pertinent to acknowledge the profoundly personal character of Zuma’s ongoing involvement in politics.
Indeed, I posit that Zuma’s apparent reluctance to fade into the proverbial sunset of his political career may not solely be a matter of personal choice; rather, it could be a consequence of circumstances beyond his control. Moreover, comparisons with contemporaries such as Thabo Mbeki, who shares Zuma’s age yet adamantly refuses retirement without facing the bodach of incarceration, further underscore the complexity of Zuma’s predicament.
Central to understanding Zuma’s steadfast commitment to political activism is his unwavering allegiance to the African National Congress (ANC) as his political home. Contrary to popular belief, Zuma’s reluctance to disengage from the ANC cannot be attributed to disagreements with party policies or overt animosity towards his erstwhile political milieu. Instead, it emanates from a deeply ingrained belief that the ANC remains his ideological and political anchor. This allegiance is predicated on Zuma’s perception of two distinct iterations of the ANC: the familiar ANC he once knew, juxtaposed with the Ramaphosa-led ANC, which he perceives as a departure from the party’s founding principles and ethos.
In this context, any perception of the MKP as merely an additional political entity distinct from the ANC, akin to past formations such as the UDM, COPE, and EFF, fails to grasp the underlying rationale for its establishment. The MKP’s raison d’être transcends the conventional trajectory of political parties; rather, it operates with a singular focus on supplanting the existing leadership structure of the ANC. With a predetermined lifespan not extending beyond five years or the conclusion of the forthcoming May 29 elections, the MKP does not espouse novel policy orientations. Instead, its fundamental ethos revolves around the conviction that the ANC has succumbed to a neoliberal agenda, with Cyril Ramaphosa symbolizing its embodiment as the incumbent ANC president.
In this regard, anyone who views the MKP as merely another party separate from the ANC, which may morph into what the UDM, COPE, and EFF became, misunderstands the rationale for its existence. The MKP exists to replace the leadership of the ANC; it has no intention of existing beyond five years or even beyond the May 29 elections. It presents no new policy direction because it fundamentally believes that the ANC is hijacked by a neoliberal agenda with Ramaphosa as its poster boy in the ANC presidential seat. Therefore, the MKP exists to unseat Ramaphosa and those who align with him within the ANC, particularly Matamela Ramaphosa, who entered the ANC in a convoluted manner, as far back as the early ’90s, as a former Urban Foundation leaguer.
Another aspect underscoring the personal nature of Zuma’s endeavour to remove Ramaphosa pertains to the historical context wherein Zuma, guided by certain figures within the ANC, orchestrated the re-entry of Ramaphosa into active politics circa 2013/14. Ramaphosa’s ascent to the presidency was not Zuma’s ultimate goal; rather, it was to ensure Ramaphosa’s perpetuation as a deputy, thereby enshrining his position as second-in-command. In essence, Zuma aimed to “motlanthesize” Ramaphosa, a term I coined to encapsulate the deliberate constraint of a political figure’s influence within the African National Congress (ANC) to prevent their elevation to the presidency. My construct ‘motlanthesize’ finds its roots in the historical precedent set by Kgalema Motlanthe, who despite his ambition and perceived influence, never clinched victory in any ANC presidential contest. For some the avuncular but also for other the hypocritical Motlanthe was systematically confined to a predetermined role, always falling short of assuming the presidency. Conversely, Ramaphosa, buoyed by significant white support since 1978, managed to maintain his position within the ANC’s upper ranks. The ANC, with its intricate dynamics, has evolved into a realm where political contestation is often defined by substantial financial investments. In this landscape, Zuma found himself on the losing end of a battle for influence, compelling him to recalibrate his strategy and take his campaign to the 7th elections with the explicit objective of compelling the ANC to replace Ramaphosa.
Thus, the MKP primarily and essentially exists to compel the ANC to lose key areas of which KZN is central and Gauteng, North West and Northern Cape are also in the balance , thereby necessitating an early National General Council to reconsider why it believes its current crop of leaders represents the will, ethos and wishes of the ANC. The last NGC cut a diminished squeezed sitting during COVID-19 manipulated not to honestly engage in any true assessment of the leadership. I shall postulate Zuma is less interested to physically replace Ramaphosa, he is interested in the replacement of Ramaphosa, and its an agenda and plan he is in this season has decided to pursue regardless the outcomes.
While some view Zuma’s actions as mere political maneuvering, a closer examination reveals a deeper motivation rooted in legal concerns and perceptions of injustice. I shall contend that Jacob Zuma’s ongoing campaign against the Cyril Ramaphosa-led African National Congress (ANC) is underpinned by two primary factors: his imperative to evade incarceration, which he directly connects with a Ramaphosa presidency that oversaw his arrest in 2021, and his endeavour to safeguard his perceived personal legacy.
Moreover, I contend that the nexus delineating the interaction between these two predominant motivations substantiates the justification for Zuma’s actions within the contextual framework of his legal predicament and his deeply entrenched sense of personal identity and historical significance within the ANC.
Thus, Zuma’s campaign is primarily driven by his fear of imprisonment, stemming from what he and those who support him perceive as politically motivated legal proceedings orchestrated through the Zondo Commission, which he alleges is influenced by factional interests within the ANC and external pressures from certain segments of the white community. Zuma’s current predicament cannot be divorced from the legal landscape. His pending conviction in the age-old ‘Armsdeal saga’ and subsequent legal battles with the Constitutional Court Deputy Chief Justice who presided over the State of Capture Commission now the Chief Justice Raymond Zondo are seen by many as a result of politically motivated prosecutions rather than objective legal processes. The Zondo Commission, tasked with investigating allegations of state capture, has been criticized for its alleged bias and questionable procedures. The motivation for a prison sentence as insisted and instituted by the Constitutional Court led by Zondo, the first as precedent when the law provides amply for what courts can do with truant or defiant commissioned summoned ones, remain a bitter taste on the mouth of justice.
Yet I must qualify, Jacob Zuma’s apprehension regarding imprisonment transcends the conventional fear of incarceration; rather, it encompasses a profound dread that a jail sentence would symbolize the culmination of his storied life as a liberation struggle icon and a testament to the political player Zondo is. Zuma’s supporters continue to argue that his prosecution is emblematic of broader factionalism within the ANC and the undue influence of external actors, particularly certain segments of the white population. Zuma has always contended that his prosecution is bereft of substantive legal grounds and is instead propelled by partisan interests within the ANC and external pressures, including those emanating from segments of the white population. Consequently, his crusade against the Ramaphosa ANC is framed as a defensive maneuver aimed at thwarting what he perceives as an unjust fate of incarceration.
Zuma’s tenure on Robben Island and most recent incarceration episodes from his vantage point are not indicative of a mere fear of imprisonment, but rather emblematic of his enduring commitment to the cause of liberation. His apprehension stems from the realization that a jail sentence at this juncture of his life would represent a symbolic conclusion to his decades-long struggle against oppression and apartheid rule. As a figure deeply revered within the liberation movement, the prospect of incarceration signifies the potential tarnishing of his legacy as a stalwart of the struggle for freedom and equality.
Beyond the legal realm, Zuma’s campaign is deeply personal in motivation. Remaining a prominent figure within the ANC for over six decades, his association with the party transcends mere politics; it is intertwined with his identity and sense of belonging. The notion of facing imprisonment is not only a legal threat but also a profound personal affront. Zuma’s defiance can thus be understood as a defense of his legacy and a refusal to succumb to what he perceives as unjust persecution. In tandem with his legal battle, Zuma’s campaign is intricately intertwined with the preservation of his personal legacy. Having dedicated over six decades of his life to the ANC, Zuma’s identity and sense of belonging are deeply entrenched within the party’s historical narrative. The notion of facing imprisonment represents not only a legal jeopardy but also an existential threat to his legacy and historical standing within the party. Thus, his defiance against the Ramaphosa ANC is not merely a political strategy but also a profound assertion of his personal narrative and historical significance within the ANC.
The argument for Zuma’s campaign gains further traction through the lens of comparative perspectives when contextualized within global examples of political comebacks. Figures such as Lula da Silva in Brazil and Donald Trump in the United States have demonstrated the resilience of political actors in the face of adversity. Zuma’s supporters draw parallels between these cases and his own, suggesting that his return to prominence is not beyond the realm of possibility. Zuma draws inspiration from both De Silva and Trump since both were court-cased. Jacob Zuma’s campaign against the Ramaphosa-led ANC is multifaceted, centralized as driven by legal concerns, personal legacy motivations, and contemporary comparative perspectives.
While critics may dismiss it as mere theatrics, a closer examination reveals legitimate grievances and strategic calculations at play. Regardless of one’s stance on Zuma’s actions, his campaign underscores the complex interplay between law, politics, and personal identity in contemporary South African society. In summation, Jacob Zuma’s campaign against the Ramaphosa-led ANC is propelled by two predominant motivations: the imperative to evade incarceration, yet not in being held being locked up but he is held carceral to the idea that such jailing will define his legacy. It is thus reality of legacy at four-score plus two that outweighs everything. The tension of having his legacy recrafted and immortalized has become the unspoken but discerned heartbeat of Zuma. That legacy is intrinsically and innately the preservation of his personal legacy within the ANC’s historical narrative. While critics may deride his actions as political theatrics, a fastidious analysis reveals the legitimacy of his grievances and strategic calculations.
Ultimately, Zuma’s campaign underscores the intricate interplay between legal exigencies, personal identity, and political resilience in the contemporary South African political landscape. When you see Zuma addressing white audiences we must ask what do they know now that they did not want to know when they made history as the first generation to participate in marches shouting Zuma-Must-Go…
When analyzing Mbeki’s ongoing, in reference to his recent TMALI address, managing of history and rhetoric of self-aggrandizement, specifically directed towards vilifying Zuma while absolving himself and the entire ANC, it becomes apparent that Mbeki’s motivations are deeply rooted in the events surrounding his defeat in the leadership contest for a third term in December 2007 at Polokwane. Moreover, the lingering caustic memory of the night in September when he was compelled to resign, symbolized by the idling aircraft that once facilitated his global engagements, further underscores Mbeki’s sense of betrayal and personal grievance. Despite the factual knowledge that Zuma did not endorse his removal, Mbeki strategically assigns blame to Zuma for the shortcomings within the ANC, thereby absolving himself and Ramaphosa of any culpability. This deliberate scapegoating of Zuma serves to preserve Mbeki’s own legacy and shield him from accountability for past failures within the party.
Both Mbeki and Zuma, now in the twilight of their political careers, demonstrate a keen awareness of their legacies, drawing parallels with the biblical notion of a lifespan of seventy years as a metric for evaluating their impact. Their actions are motivated by a desire to shape how history will remember them, with each meticulously selecting their successor as the focal point for either perpetuating or revising their legacies. However, the disparity between Mbeki and Zuma in their respective legacy contests becomes evident when considering the absence of any imminent legal repercussions threatening Mbeki’s liberty. This juxtaposition is particularly striking given the involvement of Mbeki’s signature, input, and influence in the controversial arms deal, which remains conspicuously unchallenged in the courts despite its implications. MKP’s existence is the same as that of COPE in the aftermath of Polokwane. The difference is Mbeki who knew about COPE’s planning lacked the guts to come out and own it as his party. Until the surrogate mothers of a COPE better eternalised as SHIKOTA[ Shilowa and Lekota] faced each in court battles for years. Zuma opted to come out to own MKP because MKP is really the ANC without the latter’s current Ramaphosa leadership.
The comparison between Mbeki and Zuma becomes particularly pronounced when one comprehends their shared perception of themselves as custodians entitled to safeguarding the essence of the original ANC. Rooted in their extensive tenure within the party, both leaders lay claim to an intimate familiarity with its ethos and evolution, having served under the stewardship of the longest-serving ANC president, Oliver Reginald Tambo. As such, they perceive themselves as indispensable saviours of the ANC, viewing their successors as culpable for the erosion of the party’s foundational values. This self-perception is predicated on the belief that their leadership represents a return to the authentic essence of the ANC, imbued with the principles and ideals espoused during the tenure of Tambo.
For Zuma, the prospect of imprisonment represents not only a personal ordeal but also a broader struggle to safeguard his legacy against the encroachment of legal jeopardy. Zuma’s apprehension regarding potential imprisonment transcends mere concerns about legal consequences; it encapsulates a profound preoccupation with safeguarding his legacy and historical prominence within the narrative of South Africa’s liberation struggle. As a revered figure within the African National Congress (ANC) and a pivotal participant in the anti-apartheid movement, Zuma grapples with the formidable task of reconciling his past sacrifices with the imminent threat of legal repercussions. His apprehension illuminates the intricate interplay between personal identity, historical legacy, and the enduring quest for justice in the post-apartheid landscape. Zuma’s narrative can be metaphorically depicted as the tale of the Lion and the Gazelle. In this allegory, Zuma, representing the gazelle, seeks to inscribe his own story amidst the dominance of the lion, symbolizing the historical forces that have traditionally dictated and shaped narratives within South Africa’s political landscape. By invoking this imagery, Zuma underscores his determination to assert his own narrative agency and to challenge the prevailing hegemony that has historically marginalized voices like his own.
In conclusion, the discourse attempts illuminating the intricate motivations driving Jacob Zuma’s decision to establish the MKP and launch a formidable campaign against the ANC led by Cyril Ramaphosa. Through this analysis, it has become evident that Zuma’s actions are not merely the result of political maneuvering but are deeply rooted in his personal fears, legal predicaments, and aspirations for legacy preservation within the ANC and South African historical narratives. By contextualizing Zuma’s campaign within the broader socio-political landscape of South Africa, this examination has underscored the complex interplay between law, politics, and personal identity, providing valuable insights into the forces shaping contemporary South African politics.
Furthermore, the comparison drawn between Zuma and Thabo Mbeki has shed light on the divergent approaches to legacy preservation within the ANC, highlighting the nuanced motivations driving each leader’s actions. This analysis has not only deepened our understanding of Zuma’s campaign but has also offered a broader perspective on the enduring legacies of South Africa’s political giants. Ultimately, this discourse underscores the complexity of Zuma’s motivations and the enduring struggle for power, legacy, and justice within the ANC’s historical narrative.
In the aftermath of the dissemination of my initial article titled “Ongoing Crisis at C-BRTA: Mbalula’s Trusted Lieutenant- CEO Mboyi’s Intermittent MPhil Claims, Board Negligence, PSC Inaction, and the Implications of ANC Cadre Deployment” on March 2, 2024, accessible at https://ramalainetalkpoliticalanalysis.wordpress.com/, Ms. Zodwa Mtsweni, the Communications Manager of the Public Service Commission (PSC), engaged in her official capacity, proffering a response in the form of a comment on the aforementioned blog post.
In response to Ms. Mtsweni, I conveyed the necessity for an official correspondence emanating from the Public Service Commission (PSC), bearing the authority of the organization, to facilitate a comprehensive and articulated reply. Such a response would provide me with the opportunity to expound upon and elucidate the intricate details of the matter at hand. This procedural step is envisaged to enable the South African public to judiciously assess the veracity of the concerns articulated in my initial exposition, specifically with regard to the perceived inaction of the PSC. Furthermore, it seeks to scrutinize whether the PSC, as characterized by Ms. Mtsweni, operates within distinct silos or transparently endeavours to clarify matters surrounding its purported lack of awareness concerning the focal subject of my article.
Regrettably, the Public Service Commission (PSC) has chosen to adopt a stance implying a deficit in the author’s understanding of its jurisdiction and mandate regarding the original article on the C-BRTA. This insinuation necessitates a clarification of the legislative acts delimiting the purview of the PSC. The PSC’s recourse to reiterating various legislations is not only laborious and inconsequential but also devoid of authenticity, seemingly designed to obfuscate the genuine issues at hand, particularly its integral role in the CEO appointment unfolding saga. Despite intermittently disavowing involvement, the PSC has undeniably left its imprint as an active participant in this narrative.
Upon careful scrutiny of the article, its fundamental focus becomes self-evident, primarily involving the C-BRTA Board to whom Mr. Mboyi, the CEO, reports. Despite receiving grievances from senior managers within the C-BRTA, the Board’s response has been notably deficient. Secondly, another pertinent matter raised in the article concerns the subject of salary increases that the CEO and others received hardly 5 months into their respective appointments. The PSC with its Media Statement pretends no knowledge any of the aforementioned as ever raised with it as an institution, when this response will lay bare evidence of the PSC’s knowledge, activities, and role in documented nature.
While the original article acknowledges budgetary concerns related to over-expenditure on legal matters, the paramount emphasis remains on the CEO’s appointment. The Public Service Commission (PSC) is cautioned against appropriating the prerogative to redefine the central contention of the article or manipulate it to align with its obscured agenda. Contrary to any prevailing misconceptions, the issue at hand transcends the C-BRTA as a mere national entity; it extends beyond Mr. Mboyi’s tenure and is centred on the appointment of a CEO whose qualifications have been subjected to manipulation. This manipulation is discernible in the incongruities surrounding the initially claimed, subsequently clarified, and ultimately omitted MPHIL designation in Annual Reports. In the face of challenges posed by senior managers, the CEO resorted to tyrannical behaviour, shielded by both the Board and the then Minister of Transport, Fikile Mbalula, this while the Minister falls under the purview of the Public Service Commission.
The PSC’s expeditious release of a media statement has resulted in a conspicuous oversight of the pivotal focus of the article. The central point has never been the C-BRTA as an entity—a convenient claim made by the PSC to distance itself from legal responsibility, thereby evading its designated role. It is imperative to reiterate to the PSC that the core axis of the article revolves around the appointment of the CEO, an action exclusively within the purview of the Minister. Notably, both the Minister and the department fall under the jurisdiction of the PSC, serving as the vanguard of the State.
Hence, the basis for this right to reply emanates from the Public Service Commission’s (PSC) Media Statement dated March 4, which is directly aimed at my published article.
This response will address the various aspects of the PSC’s reply, systematically refuting its assertions and furnishing compelling corroborative evidence to underscore the inherent lack of veracity in the PSC’s stance on the subject. Subsequently, it will scrutinize the apparent deficiency in proactivity, mandated by the Constitution, exhibited by the PSC in its role as the custodian of the state, particularly in instigating and advocating for the extension of its purview to encompass public entities characterized by good governance and transparency as foundational tenets.
Ultimately, this reply aims to elucidate the reasons prompting South Africans, given the concerns raised regarding the appointment of the CEO of C-BRTA and the grievances brought before the PSC, to harbour apprehension concerning the potential repurposing of the state’s vanguard. This warrants a meticulous investigation to ensure the integrity and efficacy of the institution in fulfilling its mandated responsibilities.
Please note, out of a recognized need for compliance with and in respect for the confidentiality of the C-BRTA, PSC, etc., all EXHIBITS herein referred to are in the possession of the author and can be made available upon request.
Let us commence by addressing the categorical assertion proffered by the Public Service Commission (PSC): “The PSC wishes to state that it has no record of such a matter having been brought to the attention of the Commission for investigation.” In essence, the official stance of the PSC is an absolute lack of awareness, particularly at the official echelon, regarding any complaint ever lodged within its purview.
Allow me to categorically state that this proclamation by the PSC is bereft of veracity and constitutes a dubious endeavour at deception. I hereby direct the PSC’s attention to the official communication from the Office of the Public Protector dated December 9, 2022, with reference CMS-114089, dispatched from the email address reginaldm@pprotect.org (Exhibit A).
Advancing further, let us transcend the confines of the Public Protector’s communique referenced as CMS-114089 and continue to ask has the Public Service Commission ever been the recipient of any complaint from the personnel of the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA) concerning the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)? To jog the PSC’s memory, attention is drawn to its own media response dated February 23, 2023(Exhibit B), disseminated by Bobby Jordan. In addressing a query from the Sunday Times pertaining to the reception of a complaint from C-BRTA staff regarding concerns about the CEO, the PSC acknowledged receipt of such a complaint in 2022. Nonetheless, the PSC asserted that, since the matter involved a public entity, it fell beyond the scope of its mandate, prompting the referral of the complaint to the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency on November 30, 2022. Herewith the exact question and subsequent response.
Question: “Has the PSC received some form of complaint/ grievance from the staff within CBBTA[ CRBTA]related to concerns about the CEO? If so has the OPSC taken a decision yet on whether to investigate the grievances/ allegations?”
Answer: “The Public Service Commission (PSC)did receive a complaint about the CEO of the Cross Border Road Transport Agency in 2022. The scrutiny of the complaint established that the complaint relates to a public entity, which does not fall within the mandate of the PSC. To this end, the complaint was referred to the Cross Border Road Transport Agencies on 30 November 2022, as the matter falls outside the mandate of the PSC.”[sic]
Moreover, as elucidated in my preceding discourse, the matter concerning the C-BRTA and its CEO underwent parliamentary scrutiny by the official opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). It is imperative to underscore that Parliament, the Minister of Transport, and the Department collectively operate within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission.
In the fourth instance, it is imperative to scrutinize whether any personnel or officials of the Public Service Commission conducted an investigation into the aforementioned complaints, and if so, does there exist a designated case number to this effect?
Contrary to the PSC’s repudiations in both its comments and the official media statement released on March 4, 2024, compelling evidence indicates the existence of a self-generated PSC Case Number: 9920221128134919 (Exhibit C) and a compilation of emails (Exhibit D) corroborating communications sent and received from Themba Vukeya with email address ThembaV@psc.gov.za and Mbuso Ntshangase with email address MbusoN@opsc.gov.za related to the investigation.
On the subject of complaints raised with the PSC on the CEO appointment and, in addition, the salary increases of the executive team, the evidence is a letter penned by the CEO Mr. Lwazi Mboyi. The CEO’s letter with the subject matter: “Re Referral of a Case of alleged Corruption Reported to the National Anti-Corruption Hotline (NACH) Case Reference Number 9920221128134919,” addressed to Advocate Dinkie Dube, the Director General of the Office of the Public Service Commission. This letter of the C-BRTA CEO Mboyi to the PSC in its introduction reads: “Reference is made to the correspondence received regarding the alleged Corruption reported through the National Anti-Corruption Hotline, dated 30 November 2022. As highlighted in the acknowledgment letter of 1 February 2023, the contents were received on 26 January 2023 and received by the CEO on 31 January 2023.” (Exhibit E)
The content and intention of Mboyi’s letter were to dismiss the issues raised and claim all have been addressed. That by itself can be engaged, particularly since Mr. Mboyi as CEO is the accused. Yet, the more pertinent issue here for this discourse is the PSC in communication with the C-BRTA, which its Media Statement categorically denies.
The query regarding the PSC’s receipt of a complaint in 2022 about the C-BRTA and its CEO is thus herewith unequivocally affirmed by at least the following six distinct sources:
The Public Protector’s official communique to the PSC and to the complainants.
PSC’s own media responses.
The letters between the PSC and the C-BRTA.
The undeniable evidence of a PSC Case number already alluded to.
Correspondence in email exchanges between C-BRTA staff and PSC Officials.
The knowledge of a meeting held around October and November 2023 between PSC Officials and the CEO of the C-BRTA.
It is salient to note that in its attempt to elucidate its position, the PSC asserted that it referred the matter to the C-BRTA on November 30, 2022. This precipitates an inquiry into the authority the PSC assumed as derived to refer a matter, addressed by the Public Protector, to the PSC on an entity (C-BRTA) over which it reminds us it lacks legal jurisdiction. From where would this mandate to refer the subject be derived from in this instance given the fact that the C-BRTA is a public entity that the PSC has no jurisdiction over? Additionally, elucidation is sought regarding the specific individual[s] at the C-BRTA to whom the PSC directed this matter, accompanied by evidentiary documentation of such reference.
In response to the statement provided by the Public Service Commission (PSC) in its media release, which asserts, “It should be stated that the PSC exercises its powers and performs its functions without fear, favour, or prejudice in the interest of the maintenance of effective and efficient public administration and a high standard of professional ethics in the Public Service.”
While the intention behind the aforementioned statement may project a commendable commitment to impartiality and ethical standards, a pivotal question remains unanswered by the PSC. Specifically, has the PSC, in execution of its duties, convened a meeting with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA), Mr. Lwazi Boyi, concerning the subject matter encapsulated in the complaint officially documented by the Office of the Public Protector and voiced by a group of concerned staff?
The existing records indicate that officials from the PSC did indeed organise such a meeting, conspicuously abstaining from seeking representation from key stakeholders such as the Minister, Board, Transport Department, or the C-BRTA Human Resources. Moreover, the notable absence of engagement with the whistleblowers or complainants raises concerns regarding the PSC’s purported commitment to functioning without fear, favour, or prejudice. The act of soliciting a meeting with the accused, divorced from the inclusion of the aforementioned entities, introduces an element of suspicion and raises questions about the PSC’s approach to matters of this nature.
Consequently, it becomes material for the PSC to confirm or refute the occurrence of such a meeting with Mr. Lwazi Mboyi. I posit this inquiry with the explicit assertion that the date of this meeting is not only ascertainable but has been duly recorded for reference. This inquiry underscores the necessity for the PSC to provide unequivocal clarity on its engagements with the implicated parties, thereby upholding the principles of transparency, accountability, and adherence to professional ethics that the PSC purports to champion in the broader context of public administration.
The PSC in its Media Statement reminds us that:In addition, section 196 (4) (f) stipulates that the PSC may either of its own accord or on receipt of any complaint –
investigate and evaluate the application of personnel and public administration practices and to report to the relevant Executive Authority and Legislature;
investigate and monitor adherence to applicable procedures in the Public Service; and
advise National and Provincial organs of State regarding personnel practices in the Public Service, including those relating to the recruitment, appointment, transfer, discharge and other aspects of the careers of employees in the Public Service.
The assertion put forth by the Public Service Commission (PSC) posits that it is constrained by Section 196(4)(f), which outlines its role in investigating and evaluating personnel and public administration practices, advising organs of the State on personnel practices, and reporting to the relevant Executive Authority and Legislature. However, it is imperative to underscore that this legal provision, while delineating the ambit of the PSC’s authority, does not absolve it of the responsibility to address concerns related to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) appointment within the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA). The premise for my conviction rests on two fundamental aspects.
Firstly, Section 196(4)(f) does not expressly exempt the PSC from scrutinizing matters pertaining to CEO appointments or executive leadership within public entities. The appointment of a CEO involves critical personnel practices that significantly impact the effective functioning and governance of public institutions. Therefore, the PSC, in its role of monitoring adherence to applicable procedures in the Public Service, should extend its purview to matters of CEO appointments, especially when concerns are raised regarding the due process and qualifications involved.
Secondly, the PSC’s obligation to advise National and Provincial organs of State on personnel practices includes offering guidance on the appointment, recruitment, and other aspects of employees’ careers in the Public Service. The CEO of a public entity is undeniably a pivotal position, and the adherence to proper procedures in their appointment is integral to maintaining the standards of professional ethics and effective public administration.
In light of the above, it is evident that the PSC’s contention about its inability to act on the C-BRTA CEO appointment due to the specified section is unfounded. Section 196(4)(f) does not erect a barrier preventing the PSC from addressing concerns related to executive appointments, and it is within the commission’s mandate to investigate and advise on matters affecting the public administration practices, including CEO appointments. Consequently, the PSC is called upon to reconsider its stance and fulfill its broader responsibility of ensuring the integrity and adherence to procedures in the Public Service, even in matters related to executive leadership appointments.
The PSC furthermore in attempt of its constitutional mandate contends:“Whilst the Constitution grants the PSC the power to initiate investigation on its own accord, the mandate of the PSC is currently limited to the Public Service and does not as yet extend to Public entities. Section 8 (a) of the Public Service Act, 1994, stipulates that the PSC may investigate compliance with this Act whilst section 9 of the Public Service Commission Act, 1997, determines that the PSC may inspect departments and has access to such official document, or may obtain information from the heads of the relevant departments, as may be necessary. Section 10 (1) of the Public Service Commission Act, 1997, stipulates that “The Commission may conduct an inquiry into any matter in respect of which it is authorized by the Constitution or the Public Service Act to perform any function.”
The Constitution of a nation serves as the supreme law and provides the foundation for the functioning of its various institutions. In the context of South Africa, the need for the Public Service Commission (PSC) to initiate investigations is not only justified but is imperative for the overall health of the public service ecosystem. The Constitution thus grants the PSC specific powers and responsibilities, and a proactive approach to investigations aligns with the constitutional spirit of accountability, transparency, and good governance.
Empowerment Through Constitutional Authority
The Constitution of South Africa is the highest law and endows the PSC with the power to initiate investigations. Section 196(4)(f) of the Constitution explicitly authorizes the PSC to “investigate and evaluate the application of personnel and public administration practices.” This constitutional provision is a clear empowerment mechanism for the PSC to delve into matters concerning personnel practices, including CEO appointments.
Extended Mandate to Public Entities
The argument that the PSC’s mandate is limited to the Public Service and does not extend to public entities can be contested. The Constitution is a dynamic document, and its interpretation should evolve to address contemporary challenges. The principles of good governance and accountability are not confined to the Public Service alone but are equally applicable to public entities. The PSC, as the vanguard of the state, can interpret its mandate expansively to include investigations into matters affecting public entities.
Statutory Support
Sections 8(a) and 10(1) of the Public Service Act, 1994, and the Public Service Commission Act, 1997, respectively, bolster the PSC’s authority to investigate compliance and conduct inquiries. While these sections are integral to defining the scope of the PSC’s actions, they should be interpreted in harmony with the constitutional mandate. The Constitution remains the paramount source of authority, and any statutory limitations should be viewed as complementary rather than restrictive.
Constitutional Flexibility
The Constitution is a living document that provides a flexible framework for addressing the changing needs of society. Section 10(1) of the Public Service Commission Act, 1997, explicitly empowers the PSC to conduct inquiries into any matter authorized by the Constitution. This provision exemplifies the constitutional flexibility that allows the PSC to adapt and respond to emerging issues, even if they extend beyond the strict delineation of the Public Service.
Promoting Good Governance
The proactive initiation of investigations by the PSC aligns with the constitutional objectives of promoting good governance, accountability, and transparency. By exercising its authority to investigate, the PSC contributes to upholding the principles enshrined in the Constitution, fostering public trust, and ensuring the effective functioning of the state machinery.
Perhaps in summary on this aspect, the Constitution not only empowers but mandates the Public Service Commission to be a proactive leader in safeguarding the integrity of the public service and its entities. The PSC’s authority is not rigidly confined but is imbued with the flexibility to interpret and apply its powers in a manner that ensures the highest standards of governance in the interest of the South African public.
The PSC Media Statement asserts: The Public Protector is the correct constitutional body to deal with such[the challenges in regard to the appointment of the C-BRTA CEO] a matter.
While the PSC disowns responsibility on a technicality of law, we have shown that the Public Protector wrote to the PSC about this matter. We can also confirm that the Public Protector referred the complainants to the PSC as the correct and best-suited institution to engage, since the appointment of the CEO is the responsibility of the Minister of Transport.
I herewith refer to the Public Protector’s letter to the complainants: “In this case, a complaint has been reported to the Public Service Commission for further investigation, and the investigation by the PPSA will lead to duplication of efforts and resources. Therefore, the Public Protector advises you to refer the complaint to PSC-Deputy Director-General: Integrity and Anti-Corruption as the appropriate body for assistance.” (Exhibit F)
The C-BRTA is listed in Schedule 3 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (PFMA), as a National Public Entity and as such falls outside the scope of the Public Service Act. In addition, Rule 4 (1) (d) of the PSC Rules on Conducting Investigations stipulates that the PSC will not investigate matters involving public entities as listed in schedules 2 and 3 of the PFMA.
The query regarding the Public Service Commission’s (PSC) apparent compliance rather than proactiveness in extending its mandate to encompass public entities is both salient and relevant. As a critical entity safeguarding the principles of good governance, transparency, and accountability, it is imperative to scrutinize the PSC’s efforts in proactively embracing a broader scope that includes public entities within its purview. This inquiry seeks to elucidate what concrete actions the PSC has undertaken hitherto in manifesting proactive leadership in this regard.
Firstly, the constitutionally defined mandate of the PSC primarily pertains to the oversight of the Public Service. However, the dynamic nature of governance demands a responsive and forward-thinking approach. Consequently, one may inquire into what initiatives or proposals the PSC has set forth to advocate for an expansion of its mandate to include public entities, recognizing the interconnectedness of these entities with the broader public service ecosystem.
Secondly, an examination of the PSC’s strategic endeavours towards proactively shaping the landscape of good governance in public entities is warranted. Has the PSC taken affirmative steps to engage with legislative bodies, executive authorities, or relevant stakeholders to foster a dialogue on the necessity of extending its jurisdiction? Proactivity, in this context, would involve the PSC championing a paradigm shift in its operational framework to meet the evolving challenges posed by an expansive public service environment.
Moreover, what initiatives has the PSC spearheaded to educate and mobilize public entities on the advantages of aligning with its oversight? Proactivity transcends mere compliance, demanding a proactive dissemination of information, advocacy for legislative amendments, and facilitation of an environment wherein public entities willingly subject themselves to the PSC’s scrutiny for the overarching benefit of the South African public.
A comprehensive response would not only address these questions but also illuminate the strategic vision and concrete actions undertaken by the PSC to embody proactive leadership in extending its mandate to public entities. Such transparency is vital for engendering public trust, demonstrating the PSC’s commitment to the principles it upholds, and fortifying its role as a vanguard of good governance in the South African context.
Thirdly, as explicitly referenced in my article, the matter concerning the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA) and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) underwent parliamentary scrutiny at the hands of one of the official opposition parties, the EFF. In 2021, the EFF posed a series of meticulously crafted and clarity-seeking questions to Minister Mbalula, then the custodian of the Transport portfolio. Minister Mbalula duly responded to these inquiries. In light of the Public Service Commission’s (PSC) claim of non-jurisdiction and lack of knowledge regarding this subject matter, it is imperative to remind the PSC that Parliament, the Minister of Transport, and the Department all fall under the purview of the Public Service Commission.
In the fourth instance, a crucial inquiry arises: Has the PSC’s cadre of staff or officials ever conducted an investigation into the aforementioned complaints, and is there a corresponding case number? A matter of record now reveals that in two distinct responses to my article—first in the comment on the blog, by Zodwa Mtsweni and subsequently in the official media statement issued on March 4, 2024—the PSC categorically denied undertaking any investigation on the matters referred to it by certain individuals associated with C-BRTA.
The author, as articulated in the initial article and reiterated in this response to the PSC Media Statement, unequivocally affirms that the Public Service Commission (PSC) has indeed assigned a case number for its inquiry into the aforementioned matter. Therefore, the PSC’s assertion of non-involvement and absence of investigation in this matter is unsubstantiated and lacks veracity. Supporting this assertion, a compilation of electronic correspondences is proffered, attesting to essential communications that delineate the progression of the investigation. It is posited that a minimum of three PSC officials, occupying varying echelons of seniority, including two designated case officers and the head of the pertinent division, are cognizant of this ongoing inquiry. The designated case number is herewith presented as Exhibit C, accompanied by an assemblage of pertinent emails designated as Exhibit 4. This comprehensive evidentiary package serves to underscore the questionable nature of the PSC’s claims regarding its purported lack of information and non-involvement in the investigative process.
In summation, this response to the Public Service Commission’s (PSC) media statement, sent to all media houses dated March 4, 2024, exposes its notable obfuscation, lays bare its categorical assertions as lacking substance , and a conspicuous lack of proactiveness on matters involving public entities, in this regard the Ministerial appointment of the CEO, Lwazi Mboyi. The PSC’s attempt at exoneration appears futile as its fingerprints are unmistakably imprinted on the intricacies of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) appointment saga, despite its vehement claims to the contrary.
The Public Service Commission’s unequivocal lies, as laid bare by the array of exhibits meticulously cited in the rejoinder, pose a severe threat to good governance, eroding public trust and integrity in the oversight mechanisms of vital state institutions. The deliberate deception, documented in these exhibits, raises profound concerns about the PSC’s commitment to transparency and accountability, undermining the very foundations of effective public administration.
The PSC’s failure to address the critical question surrounding its officials’ meeting with Mr. Lwazi Mboyi, the CEO of the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA), further underscores its questionable transparency. The selective engagement with implicated parties and the absence of collaboration with key stakeholders in the course of its inquiries cast a shadow over the PSC’s avowed commitment to functioning without fear, favour, or prejudice.
Furthermore, the PSC’s reluctance to acknowledge the need for an expanded mandate, particularly concerning public entities, exposes a lack of proactiveness. The constitutional flexibility granted to the PSC allows for interpretation and evolution in response to contemporary challenges. Yet, the PSC remains reticent on the imperative to rethink its jurisdiction, thereby hindering its potential as a steward for good governance in the broader public service ecosystem.
Through this right of reply, the PSC’s claims have been effectively debunked, leaving South Africa facing a crisis of questions. If the PSC can be deemed unreliable and sophisticated in its responses, what else might it be concealing from the public? This crisis demands a thorough re-evaluation of the PSC’s credibility and underscores the imperative for a recalibration of its role in upholding the principles of transparency, accountability, and good governance within the South African public service. The PSC, as a sentinel of the state, must navigate beyond obfuscation, embrace transparency, and uphold its mandate with unwavering integrity to restore public trust and confidence.
Dr. Clyde N.S Ramalaine
BTh. (Hons.) UWC, MA Systematic Theology cum laude, NWU. PhD Politics & International Affairs, UJ
Is a Life-long social and economic justice activist. Political Analyst, Theologian, Executive, Strategy Design Communications Consultant, Author and Essayist. He is also a SARChi & CADL (Centre for African Leadership Development) Post-Doctoral Research Fellow.
In the ever-vacillating landscape of South African politics, the ongoing crisis at the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA) has unveiled a saga of leadership discrepancies, questionable academic credentials, and the complex web of political influence. For readers less acquainted with the subtlety of South African political dynamics, it’s imperative to understand the significance of the African National Congress (ANC) and its practices such as cadre deployment, a system where party members are strategically placed in key positions. This context sets the stage for comprehending the implications of the crisis at C-BRTA.
As we engage the intricacies of this unfolding narrative, it’s crucial to pre-emptively address potential counterarguments. While cadre deployment is a common strategy across political landscapes globally, skeptics may argue that other parties engage in similar practices. However, a fastidious examination reveals that the ANC’s approach appears more focused on rewarding political loyalty within the party than on deploying the best talent to address the nation’s pressing needs. By acknowledging and refuting such counterarguments, we fortify the persuasiveness of our critique and ensure a comprehensive understanding of the challenges faced by the C-BRTA.
In the late 20th century, the need for a streamlined and efficient system for cross-border road transport in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region became increasingly apparent. Recognizing the significance of facilitating the movement of commuters and freight operators across national borders, the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA) emerged as a pivotal entity, conceived through the legislative framework of Act 4 of 1998.
This article aims to explore the objectives and establishment of the C-BRTA, its role in regulating cross-border road transport, and the challenges it faces in leadership and governance. The central focus is on the appointment of CEO Lwazi Mboyi, his questionable academic qualifications, the negligence of the C-BRTA board, and the inaction of the Public Service Commission (PSC), intertwined with the broader issue of cadre deployment
Enacted by the parliament, Act 4 of 1998 outlined the establishment of the C-BRTA with a clear mandate to address the challenges hindering the cross-border flow of road transport. The primary goal was to alleviate mobility constraints faced by road transport operators while fostering sustainable social and economic development within the SADC region.
Functioning as an interstate operations agency, the C-BRTA took on the responsibilities of regulating market access and issuing cross-border permits. By doing so, it aimed to introduce regulated competition, ensuring a fair and efficient system for all stakeholders involved in cross-border road transport.
For over two decades, the C-BRTA has proudly served as the driving force behind the region’s cross-border business focus. Its establishment marked a significant step towards improving the unimpeded flow of freight and passengers across national boundaries. The agency’s role encompasses providing advice, regulation, facilitation, and law enforcement to create a cooperative and coordinated approach in managing cross-border road transport.
The Cross-Border Road Transport Act 4 of 1998 articulated the intentions behind the agency’s establishment. It sought to promote cooperation and coordination among the public and private sectors involved in cross-border road transport. Additionally, the act aimed to repeal certain outdated laws, making way for a more contemporary and effective regulatory framework.
In summary, the C-BRTA, born out of Act 4 of 1998, stands as a testament to the commitment of the SADC region towards enhancing the efficiency and sustainability of cross-border road transport. With its multifaceted approach encompassing advice, regulation, facilitation, and law enforcement, the agency continues to play a crucial role in shaping the landscape of regional transportation for the benefit of all stakeholders involved. Ordinarily entities of this a nature be they private or public sector based need seasoned and tested leadership better understood in an executive team.
The Appointment of CEO Lwazi Mboyi
On May 25, 2022, the then Minister of Transport, Fikile Mbalula, in the sunset of his tenure as Minister of Transport, readying to campaign for the powerful Secretary-General position of the ANC, in his official capacity, appointed Mr. Lwazi Mboyi to the position of CEO of the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA).
CEO of C-BRTA Mr. Lwasi Mboyi
Typically extending over five-year periods, these appointments bear significant responsibilities, as indicated in the appointment letter, which outlined Mr. Mboyi’s accountability to the Board for the day-to-day and overall management of the C-BRTA. A cursory examination of Mr. Mboyi’s C-BRTA profile reveals his prior role as CEO, albeit in acting capacity, before the official appointment, accompanied by academic qualifications, including a B. Admin (Public Finance), Honours in Industrial Psychology from the University of KZN, Senior Executive Program (WITS & Harvard Business School), Africa Directors Program (USB and INSEAD), and an MPHIL in Development Finance with an outstanding dissertation.
However, discrepancies arise concerning the educational qualifications required for the CEO position. Originally, when the position was first advertised, the equivalent roles and job descriptions mandated a completed Masters as a minimum qualification. At the time of Mr. Mboyi’s appointment, he claimed to possess an MPHIL, bracketed with an outstanding dissertation. The ambiguity surrounding the significance of “Senior Executive Program (Wits & Harvard)” and “Africa Director Program (USB and INSEAD)” raises questions about their relevance and equivalency in qualifications, adding to the uncertainty.
These discrepancies prompted inquiries by senior managers and Agency staff, with more than 60 months of employment on average, leading to a cohort of senior managers raising concerns with the Board and the Public Service Commission (PSC). The issue surrounding the intermittent Masters qualification, particularly the MPHIL, raised discomfort among the staff, with accusations of unethical behavior on the part of the CEO, jeopardizing the institution’s credibility.
In response to these concerns, the CEO took a tyrannical approach, instituting insubordination charges that resulted in the suspension and subsequent firing of managers, including nine senior managers. The ambiguous nature of Mr. Mboyi’s claimed educational qualifications became the focal point of ongoing challenges at the Agency, casting doubt on the institution’s leadership and trustworthiness.
It is important to note that at the time of the appointment of Mr Mboyi, he had already acted for the calendar and financial years 2020 and 2021 as CEO of the agency. It thus appears almost normal for Mr Mboyi to eventually be appointed as the letter of his appointment dated May 2022 with an acknowledged start date of April 1, 2022 attests. The challenge however is that Mr Mboyi’s education profile for the periods 2020 to 2021 to eventually 2022 oscillates in difference of detail as it relates to his claimed masters qualification. In 2020 as per the Annual Report, which is a public record of the State Agency, Mboyi’s holds a full Master’s Degree, the details of this qualification was augmented for the 2021 Annual Report, which now had the MPHIL with brackets of (Dissertation outstanding). At the time of his appointment in 2022 Mboyi’s fickle MPHIL qualification disappeared all-together.
The fluctuating claims regarding Mr. Mboyi’s academic qualifications, specifically the assertion of possessing an MPHIL in 2020, clarification of the qualification with an outstanding dissertation in 2021, and its complete removal in 2022, prompted scrutiny from senior managers and longstanding employees at the Agency, each with an average tenure exceeding 60 months. This group of seasoned professionals, in pursuit of transparency, formally addressed their concerns through a comprehensive list of complaints submitted to both the C-BRTA Board and the Public Service Commission (PSC). Those individuals who raised objections about the CEO’s intermittent presentation of his Master’s qualifications, notably the MPHIL, expressed discomfort at the CEO’s apparent pressure to repeatedly alter his educational credentials, deeming such actions as bordering on unethical behaviour.
This situation cast a shadow of suspicion on the leadership of the institution, eroding trustworthiness, particularly given the public nature of annual reports. The ensuing response from Mr. Mboyi, characterized by what some have described as tyrannical behaviour, included the imposition of insubordination charges, leading to the suspension of 14 managers, nine of whom held senior positions. Consequently, the elusive nature of Mr. Mboyi’s Masters [MPHIL] education serves as the focal point for the prevailing challenges at the Agency. In his attempt to defend himself, the CEO’s actions resulted in the suspension and ultimate dismissal of seven senior managers. Notably, the seven individuals who were terminated successfully contested their cases at the CCMA, securing favorable outcomes, including options for reinstatement and one case resulting in a one-year salary payout. This sequence of events underscores the profound impact of Mr. Mboyi’s academic qualifications on the organisational dynamics, revealing a complex interplay of leadership controversies and their repercussions within the Agency. The City Press of 27 November 2023 led with an article bemoaning the fact that CEO Mboyi spend R10 million of the Agency’s money in failed attempt to firing C-BRTA employees as delinquent.
A second layer of challenges confronting the CEO pertain to the documented occurrence that, a mere four months into his tenure in August 2022, Mr. Mboyi, with an initial package of R3.2million, unilaterally awarded himself a substantial increase of R1million. This action, deemed impermissible and improper according to the governing legislation Act for the Agency, remarkably went uncontested by the C-BRTA Board and encountered no opposition, questions of clarity from the Public Service Commission, a pivotal institution overseeing such matters were hardly responded to.
Mr Mboyi, authorising his own salary package increment by approximately 30%, not only transgressed the regulations during what could easily be considered his probationary period – a contravention of the Agency’s operational legal framework- but also by an excessive margin surpassed the benchmark for salary increments afforded and prescribed to civil servants during the same period. This unilateral salary adjustment poses multifaceted challenges, not only in terms of legal compliance but also in its implications for the organisation’s financial standing and the public perception of responsible and accountable governance stewardship within a public sector entity.
C-BRTA Board – Negligence in Oversight and Fiduciary Roles, Failing to Vet CEO’s Qualifications and Addressing Tyrannical Behaviour
The process of vetting credentials, education, and resumes of applicants is an expected standard practice in both private and public entities. This meticulous examination is essential for ensuring that individuals appointed to key positions possess the qualifications and experience necessary to fulfill their roles effectively. Scholars like Peter Cappelli, a management professor at the Wharton School, emphasize the importance of thorough vetting to avoid costly hiring mistakes and to maintain the credibility of an organization (Cappelli, 2015).
One notable example of the failure to vet a CEO’s academic qualifications is highlighted in the case of Mr. Lwazi Mboyi at the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA). The board’s omission in scrutinizing Mr. Mboyi’s educational background led to discrepancies in his claimed qualifications, resulting in a credibility crisis for the institution. Such lapses can have severe ramifications, damaging the organization’s reputation and trustworthiness. In the case of C-BRTA, the failure to conduct due diligence on Mr. Mboyi’s academic credentials not only reflects poorly on the board’s competence but also raises questions about its commitment to responsible leadership.
Given the lack of verification of Mr. Mboyi’s claimed education credentials, questions may arise regarding the legitimacy of his B Admin (Public Finance) and Honours in Industrial Psychology qualifications. The Board’s lack of oversight not only opens the door to skepticism about the mentioned junior qualifications but also raises queries about the accuracy of CEO Mboyi’s public C-BRTA profile. Furthermore, clarity is needed on the significance of the Senior Program courses from Wits and Harvard, as well as the African Leaders Program from Stellenbosch University in collaboration with INSEAD, with the latter possibly being perceived as a reactive measure to address concerns about unethical claims of an MPHIL degree raised by senior managers at C-BRTA.
The appointment of a CEO is a critical decision that demands a high level of scrutiny, especially in a public entity like C-BRTA. The absence of thorough vetting of Mr. Mboyi’s credentials by the board constitutes a dereliction of duty and is inconsistent with principles of responsible leadership. Given the elevated nature of the position, the board should have ensured that the CEO possessed the educational qualifications required for the role, adhering to standard industry practices.
We must acknowledge the two tenures of the former CEO, Sipho G Khumalo, who, despite facing legal challenges in 2022, currently serves as an advisor to the current Minister Sindisiwe Chikunga in the transportation sector. In 2022, the C-BRTA boards and CEO Lwazi Mboyi sought a declaration of delinquency against Khumalo in the Pretoria High Court. However, the court dismissed the application in January 2023, with costs. It is noteworthy that during Khumalo’s leadership, he successfully transformed the Agency, leaving it in a financially healthy state with a positive bank balance in May 2010. His tenure resulted in numerous clean audits, a bank balance, and a revenue turnover exceeding R300 million. Despite these achievements, Khumalo has faced criticism from detractors and the current Board, which granted Mboyi an open cheque exceeding R10 million to address labor cases involving individuals perceived as Khumalo’s appointees.
Chairperson of the C-BRTA Board. Advocate Sonwabile Mancotywa
In another aspect, shedding light on the subject of the C-BRTA Board’s stewardship, or lack thereof, necessitates an inquiry to elucidate the circumstances under its leadership that led to the C-BRTA’s excesses in legal expenditures and executive remuneration. An illustrative example of this lapse in due stewardship and discrepancies becomes apparent during Mbalula’s tenure as minister, particularly in the 2021/22 financial year. During this period, the CEO (Mboyi), supported by the board, facilitated the reimbursement of all EXCO members, contravening a 2020 Cabinet resolution stipulating that, during the COVID- 19 pandemic lockdown, no senior official in the government was permitted to receive salary increases or bonuses. Despite Mbalula’s participation in the Cabinet meeting, he allowed the C-BRTA Board to permit the CEO and other executives to receive paybacks, ostensibly attributed to COVID restrictions.
Furthermore, the C-BRTA Board must be held accountable for its inconsistency in manifestly pursuing only certain interests of the entity, particularly in relation to specific individuals such as its appetite to go after former CEO Khumalo while having no appetite to engage the current CEO. This underscores the importance of consistency, especially in cases where the Board demonstrates a conspicuous lack of interest in addressing concerns regarding Mboyi’s appointment, qualifications, and a significant salary increase within the initial five months of his tenure. This inconsistency becomes particularly salient given the Board’s active pursuit to declare Mboyi’s predecessor a delinquent director. Queries directed towards Mboyi should be meticulously examined, emphasizing the Board’s central role in the matter and dispelling any presumption of innocence, especially concerning expenses incurred by senior managers.
The C-BRTA Board is implored to provide clarification regarding the inherent ambiguity in its practices. It is imperative for the Board to expound on how such ambivalence contributes to the fulfillment of the C-BRTA’s mandate and its fundamental strategic and operational objectives.
Furthermore, the C-BRTA Board must answer how and why the item LEGAL budgeted for in the particular year, detailed as R3m, and never previously exceeded, could have registered gross over-expenditure in excess of R10m, amounting to R13million or otherwise over 350%. Ordinarily, legal budgets in entities such as C-BRTA are allocated based on the principle of periodically soliciting legal opinion if and when needed. Historically, in the existence of the C-BRTA, its LEGAL budgets have never been exceeded. The reasons for such lie in the nature and type of entity the C-BRTA constitutes, as it is a legal authority in itself and is duly resourced with the necessary legal infrastructure and personnel as an in-house function. Furthermore, budgets on an annual basis are adjusted by the inflation percentage base. A scrutiny of the C-BRTA’s expenditure since 2010 confirms that legal fees have rarely ever been exhausted in any particular year. The challenge for the Board thus lies in the lack of oversight and its fiduciary role negligence, allowing for such expenditure.
On another note, a closer examination of the actual LEGAL expenditure details reveals costs incurred with labour cases and disputes as a central item, bringing us back to the subject of disciplinary hearings of senior managers who expressed reservations about the ever-changing tertiary qualifications of the CEO, Lwasi Mboyi. The legal fees are thus for cases that the C-BRTA lost in every instance in a court of law.
The Board and its EXCO furthermore warrant an explanation on why, for the first time in the 25-year history of the C-BRTA’s existence, an Annual Report for 2023/24 is absent of figures of account. Is this possibly to veil the legal costs as exposed by the news agency, City Press? It could be alleged that the Board and EXCO thus misled auditors to claim legal fees were R5 million in the 2022/23 financial year by simply moving some legal costs to consultant fees. It is noteworthy that both legal and consultant costs exceed ten million rands.
Mbalula’s Trusted Lieutenants Shape the C-BRTA in Chairperson and CEO Designations.
Moreover, the composition of the board itself may warrant examination. If the board is perceived to be unduly influenced or constituted with individuals aligned with the appointing authority, in this case, the then Minister of Transport, Fikile Mbalula – who since have reached the most powerful position and office of Secretary General of the ANC, questions of impartiality and independence arise. The failure to conduct a rigorous vetting process could be indicative of potential conflicts of interest or a lack of autonomy within the board.
Former Minister of Transport Mr. Fikile Mbalula
The original educational prerequisites for the CEO position at C-BRTA, as evident in the advertisement published by the C-BRTA in the Sunday Times in November 2016, mandated the attainment of a Master’s Degree, a criterion that was presumably in place when the previous CEO applied for the role. However, a noteworthy alteration occurred in these requirements, effective January 2022, as observed in the subsequent advertisement. The revised criteria no longer mandated a Master’s Degree qualification, coinciding with the appointment of Mr. Lwazi Mboyi as the acting CEO and, presumably, the designated successor in the intricate web of political dynamics. This raises questions about the influence of political proximity, particularly considering that the current Chairperson of the C-BRTA board, Adv. Sonwabile Mancotywa was previously the MEC during Mbalula’s tenure as the Minister of Sports, Arts, and Culture. Furthermore, Mr. Mboyi in another career life served as the chairperson of the National Youth Commission at the Presidency some twenty plus years ago.
This interlinked network of individuals, referred to colloquially as the ‘crew,’ has been implicated in controversial events, such as the USA pop star Beyonce no-show concert during Mbalula’s Arts Sport and Culture ministerial term, which incurred substantial costs for South Africans. The recurrent presence of Mbalula’s trusted associates in various positions, spanning from Sports to Police and ultimately to the Transport sector, raises concerns about the impartiality of their appointments and could potentially explain the wilful oversight or neglect in conducting standard due diligence to verify and scrutinize Mr. Mboyi’s qualifications. This situation reflects a precarious intersection of political affiliations, cadre deployment practices within the ANC, and the potential implications for responsible leadership and governance within public entities.
The absence of proper vetting of Mr. Mboyi’s credentials by the C-BRTA board represents a failure in due diligence and responsible leadership. Thorough scrutiny of qualifications is a standard practice to ensure the credibility of appointments, and deviations from this practice can lead to significant repercussions for the organization’s integrity. As organizations strive for transparency and accountability, the importance of robust vetting processes cannot be overstated, especially when appointing leaders to key positions. The subject matter of a cricis at the C-BRTA and then Minister Mbalula’s fingerprints in control, influence and known associations with top leadership as well as the CEO’s qualifications was engaged in Parlaiment through a set of questions raised by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) Party representatives.
The EFF Questioned Minister Mbalula on the C-BRTA CEO’s qualifications, security clearance levels and the operations.
The Economic Freedom Front (EFF) in October 2022, during a parliamentary session, raised a set of pertinent issues with the then Minister of Transport, Fikile Mbalula, regarding the C-BRTA, its CEO, and Board Members.
The EFF posed critical questions to the Minister of Transport are herewith contained:
On what date is it envisaged that he will fill the vacant position of the board chairperson in line with the composition requirements of the Cross-Border Road Transport Act, Act 4 of 1998, considering the current Board has been operating for over one (1) year, and its decisions may attract litigation risk for the agency?
Can the Minister explain his relations between himself and the CEO (Mr Lwazi Mboyi) and the Acting Chairperson of the Board of Directors (Ms Lerato Molebatsi)?
Is the Minister in a position to confirm if Mr Mboyi was his deployee at the NYDA while the Minister was the then Minister of Sports, Arts and Culture? Also, if the same Mr Mboyi was the individual who was responsible for paying an American superstar, Beyonce, R500k for a no show during the Youth Event?
Can the C-BRTA Board of Directors inform us why did the post of the CEO level or qualifications requirements be lowered from a relevant Transport Masters Degree in 2021 to that of an Honours? Was it to accommodate the current incumbent?
Can the Board please inform what Personnel Management (HR) processes, vetting, and qualifications check were followed in appointing the CEO, the HR Executive Dr Tsako, the Regulatory Executive Dr Mbana and renewal of all other Executives and Senior Managers contracts?
The Minister and the C-BRTA Board as well as the CEO are requested to confirm which academic qualifications does the CEO possess, when were these qualifications completed and at which Tertiary Institution(s)?
Is the Board in a position to inform us, what Executive or Senior Management positions has the appointed CEO ever occupied before being appointed CEO of the C-BRTA in April 2022?
What is the total amount in Rands has the Cross Border Road Transport Agency spent on International travel since 1 April 2022 when the current CEO was appointed? This amount should include costs for S&T, Land and Air Travel, Hotel Accommodation, Entertainment or Meals and for what purpose was each trip?
What total number of executive positions at the Cross Border Road Transport Agency including gender and ethnicity breakdown?
What is the total number of employees on suspension at the Cross Border Road Transport Agency, what are their job levels, how long has each employee been on suspension, and those who have been cleared by internal Disciplinary Processes why are they still earning public monies while at home? Furthermore, what is the amount the agency has spent on salaries of the specified employees since their suspension(s)?
What total amount has the Cross Border Road Transport Agency spent on legal fees for the disciplinary hearings in the current financial year?
Can the C-BRTA Board, indicate what is the security clearance level of the CEO and EXCO members of the C-BRTA? Who conducted the security clearance(s), and if they are in accordance with the policies of the Agency?
In conclusion, can we be informed why during the recruitment of the CEO and appointment thereof, there was no single HR personnel or official in the process to test the qualifications and run a common clearance of the CEO, which includes checking and verifying his qualifications?
The CityPress investigation led it to conclude that some of the answers as raised by the EFF presented in parliament by then Minister Fikile Mbalula were simply not truthful, deducing Parliament may have been misled. These questions, which Minister Mbalula at the time in 2022 never fully answered, remain central to the contention of an unhealthy influence that Mbalula had over the C-BRTA and its leadership. In conclusion, the implications of a minister lying or misleading Parliament underscore the need for accountability and transparency in governance.
The series of significant queries raised by the EFF during a parliamentary session in October 2022, directed towards the then Minister of Transport, Fikile Mbalula, concerning the operational dynamics of the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA) stand. These inquiries sought elucidation on matters such as board composition, relationships between the Minister and key personnel, academic qualifications, HR processes, and financial expenditures. Each question holds substantial importance, as they collectively contribute to discerning the extent of Minister Mbalula’s influence on the C-BRTA and the veracity of information provided to Parliament.
The EFF questions encompass diverse dimensions. Firstly, concerns about the timing and process of appointing a new board chairperson underscore potential legal risks associated with decisions taken by the existing board, operating beyond its stipulated tenure. The inquiry into relationships between Minister Mbalula and the CEO and Acting Chairperson sheds light on potential political affiliations influencing appointments. Additionally, queries regarding the CEO’s history of employment and the alteration of qualification requirements suggest possible improprieties in the appointment process.
Furthermore, the EFF’s questions extend to the HR practices followed in appointing key executives, emphasizing the need for transparent and merit-based recruitment. The investigation into the CEO’s academic qualifications, executive positions held previously, and the adjustment of qualification requirements over time adds another layer of scrutiny to the credibility of leadership within the C-BRTA.
Furthermore financial transparency is brought into focus through inquiries on international travel expenditures and legal fees related to disciplinary proceedings. Such financial details are vital for assessing the agency’s fiscal responsibility and stewardship of public funds.
Also, questions related to the security clearance of the CEO and executive members emphasize the importance of adherence to agency policies, ensuring a secure and trustworthy leadership structure. The culmination of these inquiries points to the need for comprehensive answers to establish the integrity of C-BRTA’s leadership and assess the credibility of Minister Mbalula’s responses to Parliament. The CityPress investigation suggesting potential untruthful responses further amplifies the urgency of obtaining accurate information, underscoring the significance of transparency and accountability in public governance.
Ordinarily in instances where such serious concerns as ventilated by the suspended and fired C-BRTA senior managers, the EFF, and the CityPress news agency arise, the PSC from its unique tailored mandate would have a natural interest.
PSC Inactions Registers Strange Behaviour given its designated role
In the South African legislative context, the Public Service Commission (PSC) holds a critical role as a watchdog entity responsible for overseeing and ensuring adherence to principles of good governance and ethical conduct within the public service. The PSC is guided by Acts such as the Public Service Act of 1994 and the Public Administration Management Act of 2014. The central objectives of the PSC include promoting effective public administration, conducting investigations into matters related to public administration, and ensuring fair employment practices. The PSC, in fulfilling its functions, is expected to act as an impartial arbiter and a guardian of public service integrity.
However, the apparent lack of initiative or energy on the part of the PSC to pursue investigations into the claims raised by senior managers at the C-BRTA regarding the appointment of the CEO, his salary increase, and allegations of victimization raises concerns about the effectiveness of the PSC in fulfilling its mandated role. In a normal setting, such complaints would be objectively entertained by the PSC, particularly when they relate to matters central to the healthy functioning of the C-BRTA. The absence of a proactive response by the PSC implies a potential deviation from its central objectives and a failure to safeguard the principles of transparency, accountability, and ethical conduct within the public service.
Moreover, the speculated role of ANC political leadership and cadre deployment in influencing the behaviour of the PSC further underscores the need for scrutiny. If the PSC’s inaction is linked to political considerations rather than an impartial assessment of the claims made by senior managers, it compromises the integrity of the oversight mechanism. The PSC must be reminded of its responsibility to provide a transparent and just governance framework, especially in entities like the C-BRTA, where public trust and effective leadership are paramount. The sustained inaction of the PSC, in this context, raises questions about its relevance and its ability to act as a beneficial entity for the C-BRTA, reinforcing the need for an impartial and rigorous evaluation of its role and effectiveness.
The PSC’s failure to proactively address complaints regarding the C-BRTA CEO’s appointment, without vetted qualifications, subsequent salary increase hardly four months after his appointment, and alleged victimization raises grave concerns about its efficacy as a guardian of public service integrity. This glaring inaction threatens the overall health of the C-BRTA and sets a precedent for potential challenges in maintaining transparency and ethical standards in other public institutions.
News 24, SAMSA, and other transport entities all under Mbalula and the current Minister have reported on the controversial appointment of Lwasi Mboyi by C-BRTA. His substantial R1 million salary increase, just five months into the position, has raised eyebrows as it allegedly occurred without adhering to proper processes.
The recent Constitutional Court ruling mandating the ANC to disclose all records related to cadre deployment, particularly from 2013 onward during President Ramaphosa’s tenure as chairperson of the Deployment Committee, signifies a crucial moment in South African political transparency. The unfolding case has unveiled the ANC’s extensive efforts to shield Ramaphosa from potential implications. On another score the anticipation to access minutes, such as those from the August 28, 2016 meeting, chaired by Ramaphosa and documented by the late DSG Jesse Duarte, held personal significance.
In conclusion, the objectives outlined in Act 4 of 1998 for the establishment of the C-BRTA reflect a commitment to enhancing cross-border road transport efficiency in the SADC region. However, the appointment of CEO Lwazi Mboyi and subsequent challenges reveal a critical failure in due diligence by the C-BRTA board. The recurrent theme of cadre deployment, questionable academic qualifications, and the inaction of the PSC collectively pose a severe threat to the agency’s credibility and overall health.
As organisations strive for transparency and accountability, the importance of robust vetting processes cannot be overstated, especially when appointing leaders to key positions. The sustained inaction of the PSC raises broader concerns about its efficacy as a guardian of public service integrity, affecting not only the C-BRTA but also setting a precedent for potential challenges in maintaining ethical standards in other public institutions.
The C-BRTA Board’s failure to oversee its fiduciary responsibilities is evident in the lack of scrutiny in vetting the CEO’s qualifications and addressing tyrannical behaviour. The inconsistency in pursuing the entity’s interests, coupled with an absence of oversight leading to excessive legal expenditures, raises concerns about the Board’s accountability and highlights the urgent need for transparency in its practices.
In a separate context, the role of Fikile Mbalula, representing ANC political leadership and currently holding the position of Secretary General, introduces governance concerns. The potential impact of political affiliations on decision-making within the C-BRTA, especially considering Mbalula’s historical connections to the agency and CEO Mboyi, raises questions about impartiality and the influence of political dynamics on governance practices.
The questionable practice of cadre deployment by the ANC, while prevalent in various political landscapes globally, has had a precarious impact on the objectives of true transformation in South Africa. While cadre deployment is a common political strategy, the ANC’s implementation appears more focused on rewarding political loyalty and connections within the party rather than ensuring the deployment of the best talent to address the nation’s pressing needs, hindering the realization of genuine transformation goals.
Dr. Clyde N.S Ramalaine
BTh. (Hons.) UWC, MA Systematic Theology cum laude, NWU. PhD Politics & International Affairs, UJ
Is a Life-long social and economic justice activist. Political Analyst, Theologian, Executive, Strategy Design Communications Consultant, Author and Essayist. He is also a SARChi & CADL (Centre for African Leadership Development) Post-Doctoral Research Fellow.
Oral in Suid-Afrika, soos gesien op sosiale netwerk groepe en bladsye, word boodskappe van ‘n oproep na gebed vir Suid-Afrika as ‘n land aangevra. By die eerste opval en oortuiging as ‘n belydende Christen en geroepe gesant van God, sou ek by die aanhoor van enige gebed onmiddelik in my gees verheug word en saam wil bid, soos ek as Christen oortuig is om daagliks te doen.
Ongelukkig moet ek as ‘n Christen in Suid-Afrika, by die aanhoor van die oproep na gebed, eers ‘n pouse neem en vra na die identiteit van die bepaalde groep wat so ‘n oproep sou maak. Ek moet dan ook navraag doen oor watter groep in Suid-Afrikaanse Staats aanhoubare rasgemeenskap hierdie oproep loods. Laastens is ek genoodsaak om te vra in watter tyd die oproepe na gebed plaasvind, en of dit betrekking het op verkiesingstyd.
Hierdie vrae bring ‘n mens ook by die uiters belangrike, maar dikwels verdoeselde kwessie van ras belange, hetsy in ekonomiese welvaart, politiek, ideologiese, en selfs morele kontekste vertolk. Suid-Afrika bly eenvoudig ‘n land en ‘n mengelmoes, verstrengel deur ras en bedryf deur rasbelangegroepe waarin God, godsdiens, die Heilige Skrif, asook gebed, misbruik word vir perverse eie belange.
Wanneer ons as Christene in gemeenskaplikheid van ‘n God, godsdiens, en geloofsoortuigings gevra word om deel te wees van gebed, is die dwang ons opgelê om die bogenoemde vraagstukke eers mee te deel. Dit is dan juis die geval nou weer etlike maande voor ‘n belangrike verkiesing.
Die doel van my skrywe is dan juis om ‘n paar aspekte aan te spreek. Eerstens wil ek die bedrewe Goebbels-mite van ‘n ‘godsvresend’ en ‘godsdienstige Suid-Afrika’ in die geskiedenis uitwys vir wat dit is – niks anders as oëverblindery, wensdenkery en ‘n infame leuen. Tweedens wil ek die betrokke en bepaalde rasgroep se ekonomiese en politieke belange as onderbou van die gebedsoproep ontmasker. Derdens wil ek die dubbelsinnigheid van ‘n swaarbelaaide politieke agenda wat vandag vir gebed vir Suid-Afrika aanvra, uitwys as eintlik ‘n gebed ter beskerming van ‘wit’ belange, soos altyd ontleen uit ‘wit’ vrees, in ‘n ‘swart’ konteks van politieke leierskap. Vierdens wil ek die leiers van die gebedsgroep, by name van Angus Buchan en sy handlangers Arno Van Niekerk en ander, ‘n paar reguit vrae stel in ‘n publieke debat? Laastens wil ek die goedgelowige Suid-Afrikaners wat hierdie poste aanstuur, vra om bietjie nabetraging te doen en die Heilige Gees te versoek vir ‘n gees van onderskeiding, sodat hulle die gees van die Antichris kan onderskei wat God se beeld in valse ras identiteit wil gevange hou waarin ideologie in die naam van godsdiens en gebed die koestering is.
Was ‘Suid-Afrika’ die republiek in verwaring met die land ooit in geskiedenis ‘n godsvresende land?
Daar bestaan ‘n merkbare verskil tussen Suid-Afrika en die land waarvan Suid-Afrika in 1961 ‘n republiek geword het. Hierdie twee entiteite moet nie verwar word nie, en hulle beteken nie noodwendig dieselfde nie. Die land het reeds lank voor 1961 bestaan, soos blyk uit die geskiedenis. Dit is noodsaaklik dat ons nie toelaat dat kommentators en enge belangegroepe ons oortuig dat Suid-Afrika eenders is aan die land van my voorouers nie.
Was die land ooit in geskiedenis ‘n godsvresende land?Die vraag hang nou af van wat jy verstaan as Suid-Afrika, want Suid-Afrika het eers in 1961 ‘n republiek geword. Dit hang dan ook af van hoe jy godsdienstigheid interpreteer. Dit hang verder ook af van hoe ver jy wil teruggaan in die raaiselagtige geskiedenis van ‘n Suid-Afrika. Ek wil dan sê dat as jy Suid-Afrika ontneem van die naam, en vir ‘n oomblik net na ‘n suidland van Afrika of Afrika se voet verwys, sal jou lei na tyd van inboorlinge. Hulle is later deur Europese geskiedskrywers aangedui as die KhoeSAN, wat die oorspronklike mense van die land was. Hierdie mense maak my voorouers uit.
Laat my toe om dan te postuleer, die eerste ontheiliging in ‘n reeks van ontmaagdiging van die land het plaasgevind toe die Portugese in 1483 gepoog het om die inboorlinge [my voorouers] aan te val. Hierdie aanval is egter met weerstand afgeslaan, en daar sou nie weer so ‘n Europese aanval plaasvind vir die volgende 169 jaar nie, totdat uit Nederland Jan Van Riebeeck in 1652 aangekom het. Die geskiedenis toon duidelik aan dat die inboorlinge en mense met ‘n oorspronklike herkoms inheems was aan die land en daarin vreedsaam geleef het. In my oortuiging is dit hierdie mense wat God en die land geeër en geken het. Selfs later sou die Britte ook hier aankom, en die land sou ‘n besetting beleef sedert 1820, wat sou voortduur, en ‘n 1910 Koloniale Staat vestig, tot die aanvang van die Apartheidstaat in 1948 toe die Boere wie in oorlogstryd met die Engelse hulself as die regerende mag herskryf het. Dit is dan onder so ‘n apartheid bewind dat Suid-Afrika as ‘n republiek ontstaan het. So die tweede ontheiliging in ‘n reeks van ontmaagdiging van die land met eerste gepoog deur die Portugese, is finaal voltrek met die aankoms van die krimineel Jan Van Riebeek wie die oorspronklike inboorlinge met slinksheid en geweld beroof het van hulle land, vee en sou plaas in minder mens wees van beskrywing daardeur die eerste onderdrukking blootstel.
Indien jy wil vergeet, ek gaan jou nie so ‘n voorreg toestaan. Daar was ‘n tyd toe die inheemse nomadies land besitters, die eintike eerste mense in wat vandag bekend staan as Suid Afrika, verklaar was as ‘vermin’ of onrasiel, betekende jy kon my voorouers goedsmoed raakloop terwyl hulle in hul ontneemde land in nomadiese style van outentiek menswees bewandel en hulle goedsmoed bedood met absolute geen vervolging nie. Gedurende die 18de en 19de eeu is die Khoesan-mense in Suid-Afrika tragies as “onrasiel” verklaar onder koloniale beleid, wat ‘n donker tydperk van ontmensliking en onderdrukking weerspieël. Die term “onrasiel” verwys histories na diere wat as plae of hinderlike beskou word, dikwels geassosieer met die dra van siektes of skade aan oes of eiendom. Wanneer dit op menslike bevolkings toegepas word, soos in die geval van die Khoesan-mense wat gedurende die 18de en 19de eeu as “onrasiel” verklaar is, verteenwoordig dit ‘n ontmenslikende en diskriminerende klassifikasie. In hierdie konteks was dit ‘n neerhalende etiket wat gebruik is om onderdrukkende beleid en praktyke teen die Khoesan-mense te regverdig, hulle behandelend asof hulle ‘n dreiging of las was wat uitgewis moes word.
Dit is die erg bebloede en geskonde geskiedenis waarin die land ontheilig was en van God geskeur is, waar die mag van die antichris sy eerste taktieke geopenbaar het, is wat baie in ‘wit’ geledere nie van wil hoor of aanspreeklikheid neem nie. Maar dit is en bly die geskiedenis wat aanhou bly kleef en net soos die Jode nie hulle tragiese moment van Europese ondermyning en uitwissing by die hand van Adolf Hitler kan of mag vergeet nie, sal ons nooit die uitwissing van ons voorouers, hul tale, kultuur, godsdiens, land, menswees en respek vir dit wat God toe vertrou het, hetsy dier of plant, kan vergeet nie. Ons sal doelbewus oor dit praat, en generasies in die toekoms sal dit weet.
So wanneer daar gepraat word van die land as Suid-Afrika, waarna terugekeer moet word na God, dan sou voorstanders van die dogma my nie kwalik kan neem as ek met oortuiging die Suid-Afrika waarna verwys word, uitsluitlik wil vertolk in die raamwerk van ‘n baie onlangse bepaalde en bedenklike segment van die land se geskiedenis. Die oproep na gebed met die voorwendsel van ‘n “terugkeer na God” is dan onlosmaaklik verbind met die werklikheid van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika. So wat vra die agenda nou eintlik as hulle vra jy en ek moet bid en vas? Eintlik vra hulle ons om na die spreukwoordelike dae van ballingskap in Egipte terug te keer, dit is die geroep na die vleispotte van Egipte, in weerwil van die daadwerklike kruisiging en onmenslikheid wat daar beleef is. Kan ons dan vandag onomwonde vir enigiemand en die gebedsleiers van so ‘n wekroep laat verstaan dat Suid-Afrika nog nooit ‘n godsvresende land was nie. Die land was laas godsvresend voor die eertse Europese ontmaagding.
Ek wil altyd weet wanneer Suid-Afrika in apartheid so godsdienstig en eg in geloof was. Laat my toe om dit hier en nou onherroeplik bekend te maak dat die republiek van Suid-Afrika nog nooit onder God se begeleiding was nie. Dit was eerder onder die gees van die Antichris, want dit het God se ewe geskape en gekoesterde mens in sy beeld verag en mishandel. Die sogenaamde “terugkeer” is dus ‘n mite, want dit is gebou op ‘n infame leuen.
Vandag roep ‘n misvormde koloniale en apartheid sameswering van begunstigdes heeltemal onbeskaamd gebedskringe byeen vir die land, terwyl hulle nooit gebid het teen die demoon, van rassisme wat in eertydse wetboek vervat is, juis die onheil wat in narsistiese oortuigings God se ewe geskape mense onderdruk en mishandel het.
Wie maak die wekroep tot gebed in die rasgroep verduideliking, en wat is hulle eintlike belange?
Suid-Afrika sedert 1994 is ‘n onderhandelde skikking. Die skikking is bereik deur elites aan beide kante van die spreukwoordelike spoorlyne van onderdrukkers en onderdruktes wat beide ‘n gemeenskaplike belang in elite ekonomiese belange as ‘n doelwit gehad het. Die elites, wat geen probleem gehad het om God se mense te beskryf in enge rasse omvang waarin hulle superioriteit van ‘wit’ wees bevorder het nie. Dieselfde elites’ agenda het gewen, en Suid-Afrika het toe ‘n ‘swart’ regering gekry waarin die ekonomie en land steeds in die hande van apartheid en koloniale begunstigdes gebly het. Die ontheiliging van die land en sy mense duur onverpoos voort. ‘n Kykie na hoe die elites aan beide kante sedert 1994 verryk is vanaf FW De Klerk en Nelson Mandela, is skrikwekkend. Ondersoek sal bewys dat geen BEE of BBEE-transaksie enige koloniale of apartheid-begunstigdes enigsins armer gemaak het nie; hulle rykdom het eerder verdriedubbel binne 30 jaar. Die onderhandelde skikking, waar apartheid-begunstigdes die sukkelende swart elites om die tafel geneem het, het vanaf Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma [hy het in sy tweede termyn vir sy eie gewin probeer breuk en is deur dieselfde onttroon] tot by Cyril Ramaphosa [die produk van die wit politieke mag en ekonomiese agenda sedert 1978 met sy Urban Foundation verbintenis] en al hulle familie, vriende en uitegsoekte maters skatryk gemaak.
Mei 29, 2024 – Verkiesingsdag: Die tydsberekeing van die wekroep na gebed
Tydsberekening is nie bloot ‘n kronologiese faktor nie; dit is ‘n strategiese bate wat die vermoë het om narratiewe te vorm, uitkomste te beïnvloed, en die sukses van pogings te bepaal. In die ingewikkelde dans van strategie, het die regte skuif op die regte oomblik ongeëwenaarde betekenis.
Die tydsberekening vir die wekroep tot gebed deur die bevoorregtes van apartheid, wat nou ‘n groep vorm wat aktief politieke partye befonds met die doel om die African National Congress (ANC) te ondermyn, is merkwaardig strategies en in lyn met die ontvouende politieke landskap. Terwyl Suid-Afrika hom voorberei vir sy 7de verkiesing wat geskeduleer is vir 29 Mei 2024, word hierdie gebedsoproepe ‘n opvallende komponent van ‘n breër strategie. Die doelwit blyk die herwinning van politieke mag vir ‘n sogenaamde blanke ras deur opposisie vorminge teen die ANC veral, maar eintlik teen swart-gevaar masses.
Ons almal weet dat die Suid Afrikaanse kapitalis is verteenwoordigend van ‘n unieke spesie onder kapitaliste. Hulle weier om te investeer, sit op etlike biljoene, in die Suid Afrika wat hulle skatryk gemaak het, en glo selfs nie in die ‘wonderwerk’ van ‘n 1994 oomblik en daarom staan hulle reg om enige tyd hulle geld en beleggings te onttrek en ‘n tuiste iewers elders te maak. Deur finansiële ondersteuning en vermeende geestelike eenheid strategies te benut, probeer hierdie segment van die politieke landskap publieke sentiment beïnvloed en die politieke narratief beïnvloed. Die oproep tot gebed, oënskynlike onskuldig op die oppervlak, vleg ingewikkeld saam met ‘n veelvuldige benadering wat gemik is op die herkonfigurasie van die politieke dinamika van die ontwikkelende nasie. Dit beklemtoon ‘n genuanseerde en berekende poging om die bevoorregtes van apartheid en die wie hulle uit swart geledere goedgunstig bevind het om saam by die tafel te sit, binne die korridore van politieke mag te herposisioneer onder die voorwendsel van geestelike en politieke vernuwing.
Waaroor gaan die Wekroep tot gebed?
In die huidige era van ‘n oorwegende ‘swart’ politieke leierskap binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks, dien die oproepe tot gebed georkestreer deur sogenaamde blanke Suid-Afrikaners blykbaar as ‘n verdedigingsmeganisme vir blanke ras ekonomiese en politieke belange. Hierdie oproepe teiken sistematies Christene, ongeag hul apartheid opgelegte en daaropvolgende ANC state verskillende ras-erfenis, en lok hulle deelname aan gesamentlike gebedsaktiwiteite uit. Nietemin, onder die skyn van geestelike eenheid manifesteer ‘n verdoeselde, vir sommige, agenda wat daarop gemik is om historiese voordele wat ingewikkeld verbind is aan sogenaamde blanke bevoorregting, te beskerm en voort te sit. Die oënskynlike inklusiewe gebedsoproepe neem die karakter van ‘n strategiese instrument aan, wat welmenende Christene doelbewus mislei om ‘n saak te ondersteun wat, na sorgvuldige ondersoek, ‘n verbintenis met die beskerming van spesifieke ras in politiekie en ekonomiese belange toon eerder as die werklike kweek van eenheid of die regstelling van historiese onregte. Dit is noodsaaklik vir Christene om wysheid aan te wend, die onderliggende motiewe van sulke oproepe krities te analiseer, en te verseker dat hulle in ooreenstemming is met beginsels van reg, gelykheid, en ware geestelike waardes.
Dit gaan dan juis oor die oortuiging dat apartheid-begunstigdes in siele oortuiging glo dat hulle weer Suid-Afrika kan en moet lei, hierdie keer deur middel van ‘n konstitusie waarin geen erkenning gegee word aan die werklike geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika nie. Baie min van die geveinsdes wil weet dat die konstitusie, wat vir baie ‘n heilige geskrif is, wel na die geskiedenis verwys, maar nerens dit by uitstek van naam in geskiedenis noem nie. Is dit dalk waarom apartheid-begunstigdes en hul swart finansiele droogskoon-gemaakte handlangers jou wil doodmaak as jy die konstitusie bevraagteken?
Die wekroep tot gebed gaan oor die tweede koms van ‘n selfverklaarde Ariese nasie en volk, wat eintlik in ‘n Nazi-hoedanigheid geregeer het. Omdat die ekonomie in hulle mag bly, is politieke mag ook heel moontlik in ‘n Suid-Afrika waar die ANC goedkoop speel met die drome en harte van die nog steeds benadeeldes en daagliks in die bed lê met die ‘wit’ elites wat hulle finansieel gemaak het.
Wie lei die wekroep, en waar was hulle gedurende apartheid?
Dit bly ‘n boeiende vraag: Wie gee leiding aan die oproep tot gebed, veral te midde van ‘n swart politieke leierskap? Wel, die antwoord lê eintlik voor ons almal; ongeag hoe die Time to Rise of soortgelyke groep leiers dit probeer vermom. Laat ons eerlik en duidelik wees: dit is en was nogaltyd diegene wat bevoordeel is deur apartheid, met ‘n breër identifikasie voorheen Boere later as sogenaamde “Afrikaners,” in sektore soos besigheid, kerk, politiek, en nie-regeringsleierskap. Ek kan ongelukkig nie na hulle verwys as ‘Afrikaners’ nie, omdat dit ‘n voortsetting sou wees van ‘n leuen in ‘n nuutskepping van die identiteit om ‘n bepaalde apartheid wit ras groep met die land te vereenselwig. Hierdie groep het nog altyd geweet hoe om hulself nuwe identiteite toe staan.
Mense vra dikwels wat gebeur het in 1994, toe die oomblik van ‘n geskikte politieke magsverlies aangebreek het. Waarheen het die “Afrikaners” hulle belange, energie, en agenda verplaas? Wel, hulle het nie-regeringsentiteite gestig wat swaar befonds is deur die besigheidssektor. In die naam van demokrasie het hulle ‘n demokratiese politieke leierskap aan bande probeer lê deur hofsake, en sodoende die gunstige konstitusie gebruik om effektief beheer oor die land te hou wat hulle in die stemlokaal verloor het. Oornag het hulle selfaangewese kompasse van moraliteit, konstitusionaliteit, geregtigheid, en menswees-aktiviste geword. Hierdie skynheiligheid dien slegs as rookskerms, indien jy my mening vra, omdat dit nog altyd ‘n duidelike versinning en herskrywing van geskiedenis vervat.
Die stilswyende vraagstuk en besweerde teologie deur die gebed wekroep bedryf
Die onteenseglike kontektuele vraagstuk wat ons altyd moet stel, is: Waar was die strewe na ‘n Christen Teologiese universele etiese moraliteit tydens die apartheidsera?
Ek weier om my deur enige begunstigde van apartheid, soos Angus Buchan of Arno Van Niekerken die magtige geld hande agter hulle, te laat beïnvloed. ‘Wit’ mense is onwillig om hulself ooit te onderwerp aan enige persoon wat as deel van ‘n ‘swart’ ras beskou word. Hulle het ‘n oortuiging dat hulle nie diensbaar kan wees onder enige ‘swart’ leierskap nie, ongeag omstandigheid of dissipline, en selfs binne die Christelike ekklesia. Die perverse oortuiging wat in werklikheid ras aanbid, glo hulle moet te alle tye almal lei en beheer. Hulle sal hulself nooit deur iemand wat nie ‘wit’ is, in ras beskrywing, laat lei nie, omdat hulle in ideologie en epistemologie God verkeerdelik as ‘n ‘wit’ God beskou wat hulle as sogenaamde ‘witmense’ verhewe ag, terwyl andere as minderwaardig in menswees beskou word. Hierdie verwerplike godsdiens het ‘n perverse en verwarde geloof in praktyk. Hierdie verwronge teologie in fundamentele oortuiging glo eintlik dat die God wat hulle aanbid, moontlik gemanipuleer kan word vir perverse, siek rasse-agendas. Hierdie valse teologie is so arrogant dat dit dan juis in aanbidding van ras, selfs ander wat hulle in rasse beskryf buite die grense van ‘n gemeenskaplike menslike ras, wil verblind om saam met hulle te bid. Dit alles met die doel om God te mislei ten einde hulle eie politieke, ekonomiese en ras-agenda te beskerm.
Ek weier om my te laat lei of om die bos lei deur emosionele wekroepe vir gebed, met die doel om die hunkering na die voormalige apartheid in Suid-Afrika te hervestig. Hierdie praktyk bots met my godsverstaan, godsdiens, lewensbeskouing, en dien as ‘n antitese daarteen. Dit verteenwoordig niks anders as ‘n arrogansie van ‘n skynheiligheid van teologie binne ‘n spesifieke politieke oortuiging wat vandag verkondig dat, toe hulle aan bewind was, God blykbaar die land gelei het. Hulle is juis van dié wat in die brief aan gemeent te Loadicea [die Lou kerk] in die Bybelse biblioteek boek Openbaring 3: 17 sou verwys word: waar gesê word: “Want jy sê: Ek is ryk en ek het verryk geword en het aan niks gebrek nie, en jy weet nie dat jy ellendig en beklaenswaardig en arm en blind en naak is nie.”
Hulle onttrek hul aan gesprekke oor grondeienaarskap en die gewelddadige ontneming van my voorouers se eiendom. Is dit nie opvallend dat nie een van hulle menigvuldige nie-regerings entiteite, hetsy uit koloniale of apartheid begunstigde gemeenskaplike ‘wit’ ras groep identitiet, beywer hulle vir openhartige gesprekke oor die land eienaarskap, massa ekonomiese regstelling of werrklike gelykheid nie. Die valse profete, wat vanaf die kansel en in die gebedskamer optree, glo in hulle eie skynheiligheid sonder om die implikasies van hierdie geskiedkundige onreg te erken. Hierdie onwil om die historiese onregte van grondonteiening aan te spreek, getuig van ‘n verdraaiing van morele waardes binne ‘n sekere teologiese konteks. Die ernstige versuim om die geskiedenis van landherstel, ekonomiese gelykheid, en die erkenning van die KhoeSan-mense as oorspronklikes wat van hulle land, taal, erfenis en ryk diereryk beroof is, onder die loep te neem, onthul ‘n gebrek aan diepgrawende selfbeskouing. Dit is ‘n dissonansie met die beoogde geestelike eenheid en ‘n bevestiging van die voortdurende uitdagings wat die nasie in die aangesig staar.
Dit is imperatief dat die opregte gelowiges, veral dié wat deur apartheid benadeel is, ‘n skerpsinnige gees nastreef. Alhoewel daar altyd ‘n behoefte aan gebed is, is dit onaanvaarbaar om die godsdiens te misbruik vir eenduidige ras-geïnspireerde doeleindes, wat in essensie slegs ‘n dekmantel is vir die soeke na verlore politieke mag en bevoorregting. Arno Van Niekerk en sy politieke gebedsgroepe, wat met goedkeuring optree, moet ophou om mense te mislei. Waar was die vrees vir God tydens die apartheidstydperk? Waar was die empatie vir almal? Hoekom het hulle nie teen apartheid gebid nie? Elke wetsvoorstel in die apartheidparlement is deur Christelike geskrifte en gebed begelei.
Ek nooi dan gerus vir Angus Bachan en Arno Van Niekerk uit vir ‘n publieke openhartige debat op enige platform waar ons die kettery en dwepery geankerd in ‘wit’ ras ideologie wat hulle as teologie voordoen wil weerlê. Buchan is berug vir sy aangesoolde en losgeslaagde ideologiese uitsprake wat hy graag binne die konteks as ‘n tipe teologie wil handhaaf. Ons sal onthou hoe hy ‘n paar jaar gelede ‘Afrikaners’ en Israeliete as unieke Gods verbonde volke wou uitmaak. Wat predikers nie alles sal doen vir geld, mag en aandag?
RISE SOUTH AFRICA voorafgegaan deur die 2023 ‘Time To Rise’ toe daar sterk gepoog was om die uitgetrede Hoof Regter Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng wou oortuig om die mantel draer namens die agenda te wees, maar gefaal het, in die seisoen is nog leierloos. Let wel daar sal binnekort weer ‘n swart gesig verskyn soos deur die agenda bepaal.
In die era en klaarblyklik onafhankklik van die Time to Rise en Rise South Africa is ook nou ‘n voormalige joernalis Songezi Zibi as leier van RISE MZANSI. Ek noem Rise Mzansi hier omdat ek die goue lyn wil trek tussend die RISE agenda, alhoewel onafhanklik maar in alle waarskynlikheid ook dieselfde borge in finansies want die doel bly dieselfde. Mag ek voorspel hoe ryk Zibi nou gaan word in materiële omvang.
Soos verwag die agenda bly dieselfde en alle soortgelyke groepeself ook soos besigheids man Roger Jardine se Change Starts Now Party wie ook goed befonds word deur ‘wit’ belange geld. Dus al hiertoe partye bestaan in omvang van oorsprong in die suurstof van die Koloniale en ‘Afrikaner’ wit rasgevangene, politieke belange goedgekeurde, en opgeswepe agenda. In die geval van Time To Rise, met gebed tot ‘n Christen God as ‘n dekmantel, en is dus onlosmaaklik verbind met die werklikheid van sogenaamde ‘wit’ ras belange, waarin sommiges selfs God wil manipuleer. In die geval van Change Starts Now party, vra die eertydse apartheid ‘Kleurling’ gebied se mense van Riverlea and Zombi Town : Waar was Roger Jardine sedert sy terugkeer van Amerika as student en ten tye van sy suksesvolle besigheids beroep, dat hy nou kwansuis terugkeer na Riverlea die gebied van sy jeugjare?
Dit is ‘n uitgemaaakte saak dat biljoene rond gaan en beskikbaar is alles om seker te maak die ANC swart politieke leierskap in Suid Afrika na Mei 31, 2024 is iets van die verlede.
Dr. Arno Van Niekerk by een van die 2023 vergaderings van Time to Rise
Mag God nie die valse godsdiensgebede en kettery aanhoor nie, en mag Hy streng optree teen dié wat selfs dink hulle kan Hom mislei.
South Africa is poised to partake in its seventh democratic national electoral event since the negotiated settlement that produced its inaugural 1994 electoral moment. The announcement by President Ramaphosa to conduct the elections in May came as a surprise to me, as my earlier anticipation had been for August, taking into consideration the internal dynamics within the African National Congress (ANC). I acknowledge my error in this regard. With the electoral date now established, it is opportune to address inquiries from those seeking guidance on voting choices.
Since 1999, I have refrained from affiliating with any political party, allowing my ANC membership to lapse. This deliberate decision has been motivated by a firm commitment to preserve my ability to openly express critical views without constraint. Despite this, my voting history until the era of President Ramaphosa reflects consistent support for the ANC. However, during this specific period, I opted for a protest vote in favour of the Black First Land First (BLF) movement.
I firmly believe that voters should comprehend their inherent power and agency, and consequently, they must resist feeling beholden to any particular political party. This autonomy empowers them to exercise their conscience, either by rebuking or rewarding policies and actions as they deem necessary for the advancement of South Africa.
It is pertinent to note my resolute decision to abstain, since 1999, from rejoining any political party or associating with a specific ideological stance, thereby refraining from affiliating myself with any party regalia. My approach to the act of voting has undergone an evolution, with a deliberate emphasis on prioritizing personal interests as the fundamental basis. I am steadfast in upholding a position of non-allegiance to any particular political party. Consequently, I affirm my right to impartially assess and scrutinize political parties, avoiding any sense of entitlement, as they actively vie for my vote. This stance is rooted in the recognition and maintenance of my agency to determine what is in the best interest of both my family and South Africa, as perceived from my unique vantage point.
My Public Record of Challenges with the PA
If I am to advise voters to vote for the PA, I am compelled to do so objectively and also transparently communicate my challenges with the PA for the record. It is duly recorded that I have publicly expressed disagreements with the Patriotic Alliance (PA) on a range of issues. Enumerated below, in no specific chronological order but of substantive concern, are seven noteworthy points:
The establishment of an LGBTIQ League by the PA, driven by emotional and expeditious motives, raises concerns about the potential further marginalization of this group.
The persistent absence of an organized structure in policy and infrastructure within the growing party inadvertently consolidates the president’s authority as the ultimate voice on PA matters in practical application.
The PA’s overtly biased stance on Israel, without addressing the injustice inflicted on Palestine, where a significant Christian population resides, contradicts the principle of equality among people created by the same God professed by PA leaders.
The party’s focus on targeting the church and its leadership, often culminating in agreements with pastors who later express dissatisfaction and accuse PA leadership, is a point of contention.
While I support the PA’s unwavering stance on illegal immigrants, there is a notable absence of a well-thought-out, constitutionally aligned strategy for implementing this policy. Simply declaring the expulsion of all illegal foreigners upon assuming office lacks logical and sustainable justification.
The PA, like other parties, should prioritize transparency regarding the sources of its funding. While legislative frameworks exist, true transparency remains elusive across political parties.
The unfortunate deployment of members within the PA, similar to practices observed in the ANC and DA, raises concerns about skills deployment based on membership rather than merit. In Part 2, I will elaborate on my experience serving as an MTC Board member in the City of Johannesburg in 2020 on a PA ticket without being a member. I will further explore how the PA’s stance, despite acknowledging the undeniable skills of non-members, increasingly aligns itself with the ANC-led patronage system of reward.
The allegations linking PA leaders with the notorious underworld also present a source of concern. I had anticipated a categorical condemnation of these claims from the PA leadership, accompanied by a clear disassociation from any such unsavoury associations. In my perspective, the deterrent effect on voters is not necessarily due to the veracity of these claims but rather stems from the PA’s perceived lack of a coherent strategy in addressing such allegations.
Another disconcerting aspect is the hitherto absence of a political school within the PA, designed to impart the unique culture and ethos of the party to all incoming members. Nevertheless, it is imperative to acknowledge that the success of the PA is intricately tied to its leadership, with Gayton McKenzie occupying a central role.
In this two-part series, I will advocate a segment of South Africa’s populace still racially explained in State language and policy as ‘Coloured’ to consider endorsing the Patriotic Alliance in the upcoming elections on May 29, 2024.
Part 1, undertakes three primary objectives. Firstly, it gives a contextual analysis in overview of the historical voting patterns, delineating the essentially race-based nature of apartheid and democratic states’ political landscapes. This examination aims to elucidate the distinct and explicable party political footprints that emerged under both regimes. Secondly, it engages the ideology of minority politics, employing the late Amichand Rajbansi’s Minority Front as a prominent case study. This exploration seeks to elucidate the dynamics and impact of minority representation in a political context.
Lastly, it advances the argument that successive ANC-led states, by persistently adhering to an uphold of race rhetoric with uncritical identity markers of ‘African’, ‘Coloured’, ‘Indian’, and ‘White’ in defining its citizens, compel individuals and groups to engage in political ideology, formation, practices and thus exercise their democratic franchise inevitably entangled in the uncritically racial reality of South Africa.
Part 2 endeavours to provide a defensible justification for why the Patriotic Alliance (PA) offers hope for the Coloured community. This will be supported by practical examples illustrating the PA’s initiatives. It is pertinent to note that the author, having served as a Board Member and Chairperson of Service Delivery at MTC, one of the ten City of Johannesburg entities, from March 2020, may exhibit transparency as a beneficiary of the PA’s influence in power dynamics or coalition negotiations. The discussion will scrutinize the PA leadership’s assertion that they are actively pursuing power and are open to forming alliances with any political entity to secure such power. This ideological conviction will be dissected, and its rationality will be assessed within the context of race-based political parties.
Part 001: Why the Patriotic Alliance is Justified to Speak on Behalf of South Africa’s Coloured People in a space of racial party political interest?
Since the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, the nation has witnessed a complex and evolving landscape of voting patterns that reflect its diverse racial makeup. The democratic transition marked the end of apartheid, a system of institutionalized racial segregation, and ushered in an era of inclusivity. However, the legacy of apartheid still lingers in the minds of many, shaping the political preferences and voting behaviours of South Africans.
The South African voting patterns are intricately linked to the racial classifications established during the apartheid era, categorizing the population into four main groups: African, Coloured, Indian, and White. The post-apartheid state has actively promoted the idea of a rainbow nation, emphasizing unity in diversity. Nevertheless, the racial divisions persist, and they are evident in the voting choices made by different racial groups.
The African National Congress (ANC), historically positioned as the party that spearheaded the struggle against apartheid, has traditionally secured robust support from the demographic group it has, in a borrowed sense from the apartheid era, come to categorize as the ‘Black’ or ‘African’ population. The voting patterns within the ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’ communities, however, have exhibited notable diversity since 1994. Initially, substantial percentages of these communities supported the ANC, but over time, this backing has diminished. Presently, there is a discernible split, with some individuals within these communities continuing to align with the ANC, while others gravitate towards opposition parties, most notably the Democratic Alliance, which has emerged as a primary beneficiary of this shifting dynamic. In contrast, the ‘White’ population has consistently favoured political parties that align with their interests, notably the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Freedom Front.
Understanding South African voting over the last 30 years requires an acknowledgment of the racial component that underscores this complex socio-political landscape. While strides have been made towards creating a unified nation, the persisting racial disparities in socio-economic factors contribute to the shaping of voting patterns. The challenge for South Africa moving forward lies in fostering a sense of common national identity while addressing the historical and ongoing racial inequalities that influence the choices made at the ballot box.
Examining the Western Cape as a geographic focal point for analyzing election voting patterns, several analysts have put forth various rationales for the electoral outcomes in this region. Schlemmer (1999, p. 288) posits that South African voter motivations are largely driven by ‘symbolic or identity concerns’, resulting in election outcomes resembling a ‘racial or ethnic census.’ On the contrary, Sniderman (2000, pp. 68-69) contends that political institutions, rather than voters, establish and organize the intricacies of politics. Daniel and Southall (2009, p. 268) attribute the choices made by political parties, particularly the ANC at a particular instance with Ebrahim Rassool and COPE with Allan Boesak, to the personality of Premier candidates. They assert that the ANC’s decisions related to Ebrahim Rasool were aimed at regaining support among Coloured voters, while the Congress of the People’s (COPE) selection of Allan Boesak dealt a substantial blow to the ANC due to his enduring influence, especially within the Coloured community. These perspectives raise the fundamental question of whether election outcomes in the Western Cape primarily result from the actions of voters or the strategic maneuvers of political parties.
I wish to assert that the issue of racial group identity is an incontrovertible reality, stemming not merely from individual choices or preferences of perspectives, but predominantly from the successive expressions of the democratic state since 1994. The state, driven by its imperative for redress, has unquestioningly confined the South African citizenry within susceptible racial identity markers. Regardless of alternative explanations posited by analysts, the role of the state as paradigmatic in shaping social identities remains a central and indispensable component, serving as a lens through which election dynamics ought to be comprehended. It appears imprudent to predicate race in group classification as a basis for identity markers and subsequently dismiss its significant influence in political formations, the establishment of political parties, and the delineation of group interests.
The aphorism “Do not despise small beginnings” resonates as an ancient biblical maxim that involuntarily imposed itself upon my contemplation when scrutinizing the evolving dynamics of South African politics, particularly at the local government level, with the Patriotic Alliance (PA) as a noteworthy participant. The political terrain is inherently mutable, and while the African National Congress (ANC) has celebrated victories since the onset of democracy, emerging parties, initially diminutive and seemingly inconsequential against the backdrop of the broader political economy, have altered the canvas of South African politics.
It is plausible to conjecture that post-May 29, 2024, the ANC may experience a loss of control over additional provinces, with KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, North-West, Mpumalanga, and the Northern Cape being particularly susceptible to a shift from ANC majority. Such a scenario implies a potential transition towards a more federal or provincial identity of governance for South Africa, wherein the ANC, if retained in power, would owe its incumbency to the delicate nature of coalition agreements. The contemplation of an ANC administration operating nationally with less than five of the nine provinces under its dominion necessitates a thorough examination of the potential implications and repercussions that may arise in such a political landscape.
Minority Representation Amichand Rajbansi Political Strategy
Scholarly discourse on minority representation posits that it fortifies representational bonds, fostering positive attitudes towards government and encouraging political engagement. Current scholarship contends that minorities achieve equitable representation in single-winner districts when the minority population is politically homogeneous and geographically concentrated, as suggested by Welch (1990) and Casellas (2009) in their analyses of Hispanic populations. South Africa’s democratic trajectory underscores a shift in focus from national seats in parliament to local government over the past 26 years. Local government, representing the crucible of community concerns, assumes paramount importance. The ANC’s neglect of this sphere, essential for governance, reveals a fundamental error, as local government encapsulates the nexus of citizenry and government, embodying the presence or absence of service delivery.
A modulated exploration of post-settlement South African minority politics finds resonance in the regional contributions of the late Amichand Rajbansi and his Minority Front concentrated in Kwa-Zulu Natal. Initially disparaged as racially charged, inconsequential in numerical terms, and somewhat cynical, Rajbansi’s political endeavours now reveal a more profound understanding, echoed in the subsequent work of the Patriotic Alliance. Although the efficacy of minority representation in working for its constituency may not always be readily apparent, Rajbansi’s ideology, strategy, and tactics serve as a foundation for understanding this political trajectory.
Rajbansi’s ideology rested on the belief that minorities, despite their numerical inferiority, can wield influence where it matters. Recognizing the concentration of Indians, historically linked to the garment industry, mainly in Natal and later in KwaZulu-Natal under democracy, Rajbansi acknowledged that numerical superiority against the ANC was unattainable. Consequently, he positioned himself as a powerbroker with regional prominence, engaging with any political party to influence election results shaped by race classification preferences. Rajbansi astutely recognized that Indians, as a group, did not align with the ANC, leading him to target those within his community who refrained from supporting the ANC, National Party, or Democratic Party at the time. His strategic approach involved creating a political vehicle to carry the mandate on behalf of those who did not favor the aforementioned parties. Rajbansi’s tactics involved engaging with his people, speaking their language—both figuratively and literally—by understanding that Indian communities communicate in their traditional languages (e.g., Gujarati). He addressed their concerns as ratepayers, asserting their rights enshrined in the constitution. Despite facing accusations of exclusivism, racism, and self-serving motives, particularly from politically connected Indian elites within the ANC, Rajbansi’s calculated approach allowed him to be a significant power broker, impacting outcomes at regional, provincial, and, to a lesser extent, national levels.
Amichand Rajbansi founded the Minority Party in KwaZulu-Natal with a distinct focus on representing the interests of the Indian community within the broader political landscape of South Africa. Recognizing the relatively small percentage of the population that the Indian community constituted, particularly in comparison to the majority African population, Rajbansi sought to establish a political entity that could serve as a dedicated voice for the concerns and aspirations of the Indian minority. The intention behind the formation of the party was rooted in the belief that a specific platform was essential to effectively advocate for and negotiate the unique interests of the Indian community within the proverbial sea of African majority, ensuring that their needs and perspectives were not overlooked in the democratic process. Through the Minority Party, Rajbansi aimed to provide a platform for meaningful representation and bargaining power for the Indian population in the complex socio-political landscape of post-apartheid South Africa
The Patriotic Alliance, established in 2013 and marking its eleventh year of active politics, has actively participated in critical provinces and municipalities, displaying gradual but notable results. The PA’s anchor base includes representation in the Western Cape – Beaufort West, Nelson Mandela Metro, City of Joburg Metro, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane, and Cape metros. Notably, the PA’s decision to support the Democratic Alliance’s Atholl Trollip against the Economic Freedom Fighters’ (EFF) opposition, led by Kenny Kunene, exemplifies principled decision-making in navigating race politics. The PA’s business case for its anchor base is justifiable, considering the disenfranchisement, economic deprivation, and lack of social identity agency faced by the Coloured community, a group that has been overlooked in terms of service delivery, job opportunities, economic participation, equality, and development.
The enduring colloquialism, “first-not-white-enough-now-not-black-enough,” succinctly captures the predicament of the Coloured community, which, despite being classified and stratified since 1994, experiences ongoing disenfranchisement. The ANC’s uncritical adoption of apartheid-era lexicon has perpetuated the fallacy of race as a social construct, inadvertently reinforcing discriminatory practices. While the Coloured community exhibits diverse identity articulations, the democratic state’s adoption of apartheid-era labels without critical engagement has contributed to their continued disenfranchisement. The Patriotic Alliance, recognizing the necessity and duty to respond to the economic disempowerment of ‘Coloured’ communities, has organically chosen to raise its banner in addressing these real challenges.
Acknowledging the Patriotic Alliance’s existence as a response to economic disenfranchisement akin to apartheid victims and, more specifically, the ‘Coloured’ identity markers, underscores the centrality of this contextual reality to the party’s raison d’être. While challenges may be raised, the PA’s response to economic disenfranchisement, within the frame of Coloured definition, positions it as a player in the local governance index of minority parties. In essence, the Patriotic Alliance must be understood and interpreted within the context of a political entity responding to the imperative of redressing historical economic marginalization, particularly as experienced by the Coloured community.
I distinctly recall authoring an unsolicited discussion document in around 2019/2020 concerning the imperative for the Patriotic Alliance (PA) to delineate its focus. In the alluded document, I argued that the PA’s strategic positioning was not a matter of choice but an exigency dictated by the prevailing political landscape, voting patterns in South Africa since 1994, and the undeniable disenfranchisement experienced by Coloureds as a collective. Notably, I highlighted a disconcerting statistic indicating that the likelihood of a Coloured male youth securing employment in South Africa stands at a mere 14.1%. This document was communicated to PA leader Gayton McKenzie, who initially expressed disagreement with the notion that the PA must unequivocally centre its mission on the advancement of Coloureds. In response, I encouraged him to review the document. It is now a matter of historical record that the PA explicitly represents the Coloured constituency as its central focus, concurrently demonstrating a commitment to inclusivity by appointing individuals from all racial backgrounds to positions of influence whenever empowered to do so.
In light of the state’s classification of individuals and a group as ‘Coloured’ and the inherent race-informed characteristics of South Africa’s voting patterns, a critical examination of the political landscape reveals a dearth of parties that have distinctly addressed the historical legacies perpetuated by both apartheid and successive ANC-led states’ preoccupation with race as a means to explain its citizens and the impact on those it continues to classify and identify as belonging to a ‘Coloured’ race. In this context, a viable alternative emerges in the form of the Patriotic Alliance (PA), prompting one to contemplate the imperative of supporting a party that may be positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and advocate for the nuanced concerns associated with the Coloured community.
Sunday World in its February 5, publication led with a headline: “Zondo Sparks Controversy over Yacoob’s Appointment to the Apex Court.”
In the report, journalist Mzilikazi wa Afrika asserts, “Chief Justice Raymond Zondo this week failed to explain why he appointed controversial retired judge Zak Yacoob to the Constitutional Court. Yacoob’s appointment is shrouded in secrecy, and it is believed he was hired to look at all the appeal cases before the Constitutional Court. In essence, sources said, Yacoob would have the power to advise the 11 justices of the court on which appeal case to dismiss and which to entertain, raising red flags on the constitutional principle of judicial independence. It is also not clear how Yacoob was selected as the most suitable person for the role or whether a public recruitment process was conducted. Yacoob, who has a history of entangling himself in political controversy, is also a long-time ally of Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan, and his shadow in the apex court would raise alarm among political rivals of Gordhan and President Cyril Ramaphosa’s administration.”
We warrant asking, who is retired Justice Zac Yacoob? A Wikipedia search of who Yacoob is provides the following summary of his life and career paths. Zakeria Mohammed “Zak” Yacoob (born 3 March 1948) is a retired South African judge who served in the Constitutional Court of South Africa from February 1998 to January 2013. He was appointed to the bench by Nelson Mandela and retired after serving the maximum 15-year term. Before he joined the bench, he was a practicing advocate and an anti-apartheid activist. Yacoob was born in Durban, where he was admitted as an advocate in 1973 and as Senior Counsel in 1991. He rose to prominence representing anti-apartheid activists in public law matters and criminal political trials. At the same time, he was himself active in the Natal Indian Congress, United Democratic Front, and other anti-apartheid organizations. In the 1990s, he was a technical adviser in the post-apartheid constitutional negotiations and a member of the inaugural Independent Electoral Commission before he was appointed to the Constitutional Court. He is well known for drafting the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Grootboom, a landmark socioeconomic rights matter. He is also a prominent disability rights activist, having been blind since infancy.”
Wa Afrika inquire into the process followed by Chief Justice Zondo to appoint Yacoob into the Constitutional Court, specifically designating him as a special adviser to the other 11 Constitutional Court Justices on which appeal case to dismiss and to entertain. This musing aims to do four things:
To critically examine the assertion concerning Yacoob’s controversial character and assess the validity of the claim, considering various incidents and interactions that contribute to the perception of controversy surrounding him.
Evaluate the validity of Mzilikazi wa Afrika’s assertion regarding Yacoob’s alleged association as a longstanding ally of Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan and President Ramaphosa, and the Implications of Perceiving Him as an extension of their political agenda.
Examining Yacoob’s self-revelatory behaviour as a potential manifestation of Racial Bias through the lens of distinct attacks on African Blacks, Considering his Indian Identity, Historically Positioned as Second in the Apartheid-Era Hierarchy of Races.
To examine Wa Afrika’s central assertion as to whether Chief Justice Zondo adhered to the established protocols in making the appointment, with a particular focus on whether Zondo objectively deliberated on the consequences of appointing Yacoob. This is located in consideration of the potential political implications and the resulting impact on the Constitutional Court’s reputation.
Problematizing Yacoob’s attitude in response to the Sunday World, Wa Afrika enquiries
Upon enquiring as to his appointment, Yacoob responded with the following words as advanced by Wa Afrika, “I have been appointed, but that’s my business. The basis of the appointment has nothing to do with you. “Go ahead and publish what you like.” The retired judge asked this journalist to stop “interrogating” him about the appointment. “Why don’t you ask the chief justice? When the chief justice gives you answers, it will be right. It isn’t my business; ask the chief justice, he made the appointment. “In fact, the minister made the appointment,” he added. Yacoob referred all questions to Chief Justice Zondo and Justice Minister Ronald Lamola. According to Sunday World, Lamola merely endorsed Yacoob’s appointment after Zondo recommended him. “The minister just endorsed the appointment because if he starts asking questions about these appointments, he would be accused of trying to interfere with the judiciary,” a source close to Lamola said.
Zak Yacoob’s dismissive and non-cooperative attitude in response to Mzilikazi wa Afrika’s inquiries regarding his appointment to the Constitutional Court raises significant concerns about his decorum and appropriateness for the office he is set to occupy. As a retired justice who once held a position in the apex court, Yacoob’s current tone contradicts the expected standards of transparency, accountability, and decorum associated with such a prestigious role.
The judiciary’s strength lies in its dignity, impartiality, and commitment to the rule of law. Yacoob’s attitude and past behaviour risk undermining this dignity. Chief Justice Zondo must ensure that the individuals associated with the Constitutional Court exemplify the highest standards of judicial conduct, free from any perception of political bias or unprofessional behaviour.
Yacoob’s blatant refusal to provide basic information and his notoriously dismissive response, urging the journalist to direct inquiries to others, challenges the principles of decorum that are essential in maintaining public trust in the judiciary. The role of a justice demands a commitment to transparency and openness, virtues that Yacoob’s response appears to lack. The judiciary, as a pillar of democracy, relies on the public’s confidence, and Yacoob’s attitude undermines this foundational aspect.
Argument on Unfitness to Serve
In this context I wish to contend regardless of Yacoob’s prior service in the apex court, his legal history, his exhibited and manifested current attitude does not inspire confidence in his fitness to serve. Constitutionally the judiciary is entrusted with upholding the highest standards of ethical conduct, impartiality, and accountability. Yacoob’s reluctance to provide information about his appointment and his attempt to shift responsibility reflect a lack of commitment in as to these essential principles. This raises legitimate concerns about his ability to fulfill the duties of a Constitutional Court justice.
Is Yacoob’s behaviour evidencing racial undertones?
Yacoob’s responses to Wa Afrika, his attack on Matthews Phosa, and Lindiwe Sisulu respectively, these all classified as firstly as black individuals and sharing an African in identity marking in South Africa, can be viewed through a racial lens. Yacoob in South Africa remains classified in racial categorisation of Indian, and there is no evidence he ever rejected or distanced himself from such identity marking. Yacoob’s alleged abusive behaviour, may suggest a discriminatory attitude toward individuals belonging to the broader category of black South Africans.
I have elsewhere in an article shared my views on retired Judge Yacoob when he took the latitude to venture an opinion on Lindiwe Sisulu’s views on the judiciary. Those who cannot engage with what Sisulu placed in front of us express these unsustainable, incoherent, and less content-based views daily. Permit me also momentarily to engage at least one of those, Justice Zac Yacoob, who responded to Sisulu’s article, not necessarily in writing. However, as carried live on eNCA, JJ Tabane Show first aired on that Sunday night. Yacoob’s behavior is precisely what Sisulu’s article exposes in the judiciary as complicit with untransformed thinking on justice.
Not only does Yacoob’s attitude translates to plausible racist behaviour but it further extends to possible sexist behavour as in the case of Lindiwe Sisulu.The text indicates that Yacoob’s actions against Lindiwe Sisulu, also classified as black, were rooted in a prejudiced perspective. The author argues that Yacoob’s apartheid hierarchical mindset, considering his Indian identity superior to Africans, aligns with racist notions and demonstrates a lack of respect for the lived experiences and opinions of black individuals. Yacoob’s response to Lindiwe Sisulu’s views on the judiciary is characterized as an attack, indicating potential sexism and mysoginistic tendencies. In this regard I have argued that Yacoob’s actions, such as accusing, arresting, charging, prosecuting, and adjudicating against Sisulu for expressing her opinion, may be viewed as an attempt to silence and undermine a black woman’s voice.
Is Yacoob held carceral by an “apartheid hierarchical mind” and the perception that he sees his Indian identity as superior to Africans? This mindset, coupled with his actions, aligns with a racially discriminatory stance, reinforcing the argument that Yacoob’s behaviour could be racially motivated and sustained by an abuse of his visual impairment that affords him an entitlement.
The argument gains strength when considering the pattern of behaviour across these instances. Yacoob’s attacks, irrespective of the individual involved, seem to be directed towards those classified as black in South Africa. This consistent pattern supports the contention that race plays a significant role in Yacoob’s attitude.
It becomes increasingly possible to contend that retired Justice Zac Yacoob abuses his disability or other ableness, better understood in visionary physical impairment [blindness], for vain, puerile, reprehensible, and uncalled-for attacks. Interestingly, these are reserved for blacks across all class definitions of a South African societal expression. This latest incoherent salvo comes on the back of his attack on former Treasurer-General Matthews Phosa. His past erratic and despicable behaviour on JJ Tabane’s Show [for which Tabane let him and Pallo Jordan both slide] confirms his now entrenched entitled attitude of a bully. His mental blindness allowed his senseless rage to take over to engage in perhaps two unpardonable sins.
Firstly, Yacoob, in distasteful injustice, accused, arrested, charged, prosecuted, and adjudicated in a verdict and sentencing commensurate with his obdurate thinking of justice on Sisulu for her rightful constitutionally afforded opinion. The retired legal scholar who sat at the judiciary’s highest office, namely the Constitutional Court, showed scant regard for the office he once held. He, in that JJ Tabane interview, acted bereft of any interest in engaging in the logic or the praxis of constructive dissent, a common approach to disagree. Instead, in apartheid hierarchical mind of his second to ‘white’ in superiority ‘Indian’ identity being more superior than Africans and Jim Crow type determined to impose the lynching of a politician. It was clear he detests Sisulu for daring to opine her views on the undeniable reality of transformation as impeded in the lived experience for the majority of people who necessarily remain black and disenfranchised. How can anyone of his stature be this blindly ignorant yet blatantly arrogant?
Yacoob’s second unpardonable sin in his Sisulu attack evidence his impoverished, vain attempt to lead the battle charge of Sisulu’s de-campaigning. He determined to instruct the ANC branches not to vote for Sisulu. This action on the part of Yacoob says more about his lack of jurisprudence. Perhaps a clanging cymbal of an antithetical hollowed mind, wholly absent of the office he was privileged to occupy when he sat in the apex court as one of the Constitutional Court judges.
Yacoob nakedly betrayed his profession and rendered every sane mind to ask, what did whoever see in this racist, fascist, misogynist of a judge ever to have appointed him to the office of the supreme court as a custodian of justice? Perhaps more troublesome is that not one of his past or present colleagues came out to condemn this pathetic and embarrassing show of injustice misconstrued for rational thinking. In an unholy hegemony of common interest cradled in the depravity of untouchableness, they would all find convenient excuses not to join the “not in my name campaign.” Is this not the hypocrisy that Sisulu implies?
The postulated argument is that Yacoob’s attitude towards Wa Afrika, Phosa, Sisulu, and on the JJ Tabane Show suggests elements of racism, given the consistent pattern of discriminatory behaviour towards individuals classified as black in South Africa. Additionally, the potential sexism highlighted in the case of Lindiwe Sisulu further underscores the need to scrutinize Yacoob’s actions within the broader context of race and gender dynamics in the country.
Chief Justice Zondo’s Role
The Constitutional Court, as the guardian of the constitution, should be insulated from political influence. Chief Justice Zondo bears the responsibility to safeguard the court’s integrity and independence. By endorsing Yacoob’s appointment without addressing the concerns raised by his public persona and dismissive attitude, Zondo risks allowing the politicization of the court.
Chief Justice Zondo, as the head of the judiciary, holds the responsibility to ensure that the Constitutional Court remains free from the taint of politicization. Yacoob’s notorious history of engaging in interviews, making political statements, and delivering insults is a glaring red flag. Zondo must recognize that the character and personality traits of individuals associated with the Apex court significantly impact its public perception and credibility.
Wa Afrika might struggle to prove the legal non-compliance Chief Justice Zondo may have fallen short of in the right to appoint another judge; he will face challenges in demonstrating that Zondo broke the law. My argument is that Zondo may very well not have erred in the administrative processing of such an appointment. Hence, locating the process is crucial but comes with the risk of raising the broader and more central issue of a Chief Justice who chose to overlook the erratic political nature of Yacoob and the potential damage he may bring to the apex court.
Unless Zondo, who is also not far from exiting, decided to be led by his own political interests, since Zondo himself has, on more than one occasion, blurred the lines between the judiciary and politics. Zondo’s appointment of Yacoob may, therefore, be criticized as irresponsible and less intended to protect the apex court in the expected non-partisan binaries that define a factionalized South African society bequeathed by the ANC.
Zondo must explain why he sees no threat in the erratic attitude and behaviour of Yacoob; he warrants accountability to South Africa for why Yacoob and no one else was his candidate of choice. Lastly, he has to explain why some perceive Yacoob as associated with Pravin Gordhan and Cyril Ramaphosa, and why, as Chief Justice, he was unfazed by these allegations.
Yacoob’s dismissive uncouth, plausible racist attitude and Chief Justice Zondo’s decidedly apparent acceptance of his character pose a significant challenge to the decorum and credibility of the Constitutional Court. Upholding the court’s esteemed reputation requires individuals of unwavering integrity and commitment to the principles of justice, qualities that seem questionable in this instance. The argument can be made that Yacoob’s attitude, as demonstrated in his interactions with Mzilikazi wa Afrika, Matthews Phosa, Lindiwe Sisulu, and on the JJ Tabane Show, suggests elements of racism and sexism, particularly in the context of South Africa’s racial classifications.
So, to see Retired Yacoob being drafted into the Constitutional Court for a specific sends justified alarm bells.
ramalainetalk 